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ARAB ISRAEL WAR - 1973
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ARAB ISRAEL WAR - 1973
INTRODUCTION
1.
The Arab-Israel
war 19 67, for the first time in 20 years assured security to Israel. She could
believe that her military superiority coupled with an expanded
territorial
buffer of Sinai Peninsula would be a deterrent for any Arab attack. But the
Israeli belief was shattered like the ‘theory of living space’ (lebensraum)
propagated by Hitler. The desert of Sinai could not guarantee Israel, peace and
security and rather she was again faced with a war.
2. The latest phase of the
duel between the Arabs and Israel erupted on 6 of Oct 73, 10th of Ramadan and
Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement to the Jews. The simultaneous Egyptian and
Syrian attack came as complete surprise to the Israelis and to the rest of the
world.
PART I
Background
7. On November 1947, UNO decided to divide Palestine in separate Arab and
Jewish States. The territory awarded
to the new Jewish State qualitatively and quantitatively exceeded that which
would have represented an equitable distribution based on population.
8. The
State of Israel proclaimed its existence on May 14, 1948. Immediately the
forces from Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon invaded Israel in an attempt to
crush the new state at its inception. The Arabs gained some initial success but
their advances were nullified. Separate armistices were signed in June ‘49
between Israel and the bordering Arab States.
9. The next war erupted in
October ‘56 when Israel attacked Egypt in conjunction with British and French forces
and quickly secured Gaza strip and Sinai Peninsula. Israel’s aim was to have an access to the
Suez Canal.
10.
In May ‘67 Kamal Abdul Nasser, the President, demanded the immediate withdrawal
of UN force from Egypt Israel border, closed strait of Tiran to all Israel’s
shipping and mobilised his forces on Sinai Frontier. The Israelis responded with a pre-emptive
attack on June 5, 1967 that resulted in rout of the Syrian, Iraqi and Egyptian
Forces. Israel captured the Gaza Strip
and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank of Jordan, and the Golan Heights
from Syria.
Zone of Operations
11. The
salient features of zone of operation are described in the succeeding paragraphs:
-
a. The Sinai Peninsula. It is the land bridge between Africa
and Asia, and is bounded by Mediterranean Sea in the north, Suez Canal and Red
Sea in the west and Israel in the East. It comprises of roughly 22000 square
miles. It is about 240 miles from its northern Mediterranean coastline to its
southern tip, and about 120 miles between Israeli Negev and the Suez Canal.
b. Golan Heights. Golan
Heights is a plateau at a height of 600 feet above the Yarmuk Valley in the
south to Mount Hermon (9000 feet) in the north, Raqauad Stream in the east and
Sea of Galilee in the west. A maze of volcanic hills called Tel, limits the
passage of vehicles. In the south the area in more accessible. A line of Tels
spans the border from Rafid Junction towards Quneitra and to Mount Hermon.
Another complex of hills lies to the southwest.
12. Important Features / Obstacles. After the description of the zone of operation,
I will now highlight the important features and obstacles, which played an
important role in this war: -
a. Sinai Sector
(1) Suez Canal. An artificial water way, which is 175 kilometres
long with width varying from 180 to 200 meters and depth from 16 to 19 meters.
The water level is 2 meters below the bank.
The banks are very steep, covered by reinforced concrete which prevent
amphibious vehicles from landing and climbing.
The current is rapid and strong. Direction of current changes every 6
hours.
(2) Bar-Lev Line. The Israelis had
spent some 268 million US $ to create a series of fortifications, roads and
rear area facilities called Bar-Lev Line.
These defences extended over 160 kilometres with 31 strong points along
the Suez Canal from Port Fuad in the north to Res-Misallah on the Gulf of Suez. These defences covered an area of 5000 square
kilometres and contained a system of fortifications, shelters, strong
obstacles, and anti - tank / anti - personnel minefields. The fortified area consisted of several lines
with well-linked road network. Armoured troops concentrations were located 5 to
30 kilometres east of Canal. There were
240 prepared long and medium range artillery positions, 30 of that were kept
active. Israel had also under ground tanks and pipes to put the Canal
ablaze. A sand barrier of 10 to 25
meters high all along the Canal was also erected.
b. Golan Sector
(1) Purple Line. This was the name given by Israelis to
cease-fire of 1967. It was a good
military line giving good command over observation and fire.
(2) Anti Tank Ditch. In ’72, Israelis has constructed an anti -
tank ditch along Purple Line to slow down any advance. In total, 17
fortifications were built behind the anti - tank ditch.
Part II
OPPOSING FORCES
Assessment of Comparative Strength.
13. A broad assessment of the opposing force's
order of battle indicates 1.5 to 1 numerical superiority in manpower and 2 to 1
tank strength in favour of the Arabs. Israel had a little tilt in their favour
in the air. This was primarily on account of vastly superior operational
performance of F-4E (Phantom) and 3AE (Sky Hawk) over their Soviet counter
parts in the Arab Air Forces.
14. Dispositions Sinai Front
a. Egyptian Forces. For the purpose of deception, it was decided
to attack across Suez Canal by the holding formations. To this end, the
dispositions of Egyptian Army were as under: -
(1) First Army. Comprising 3 and 6 Mechanised Division was
located in general area Cairo. It was GHQ
reserve.
(2)
Second Army. This army was deployed from
Port Said in the north to Great Bitter Lake in the south with Army Headquarters
at Ismailia. 16 Division on the left, 2 Division in the centre and 18 Division
on the right were deployed. It had
21 Armoured Division and 23 Mechanised Division were in reserve.
(3) Third Army. It was deployed from Great Bitter Lake to
port Suez. 7 Division on the left and 19 Division on the right. 4 Armoured
Division was in reserve.
b. Israeli Forces. Israeli Southern Command was responsible for
the Negev and Sinai portion. Along Suez Canal, a division was deployed. One infantry brigade was holding the northern
area of marshes. Forward-defended
localities along Suez Canal were based on the Bar-Lev Line with a brigade holding
31 strong points. Each strong point had
a platoon of tanks and artillery support.
Division less brigade was holding the passes in depth. However on completion of mobilisation by 8
October, Israel had ten armoured brigades, eight mechanised brigades and three
infantry brigades, which changed the relative strength ratio. The area was divided into three sectors northern,
central and southern sector.
15. Dispositions Golan Front
a. Syrian Forces.
Three Syrian divisions were
holding the front 7 Division in the north from Mount Harmon to Kuneitra, 9
Division in the centre from Tel-Hera to Kuneitra and 5 Division in the south
from Rafid to Yarmuk. 3 Armoured
Division located at Katana and 1 Armoured Division located at Kiswe were in
reserve.
b. Israeli
Forces. Israeli Northern Command was responsible for Golan
Heights. This was being commanded by
Major General Yitzak Hufi. Two brigades,
i.e Brigade District (Golani Brigade) was in the north and 188 Armoured Brigade
(Barak Brigade) in the south. 7-Armoured
Brigade initially was in reserve. On
mobilisation, three Israeli Armoured Divisions were available for counter
offensive.
Strategic
Plans
16. Sinai
Front
a.
Egyptian Plan (Operation Badre). Egyptians
planned to attack on a broad front (almost all along Suez Canal) with infantry
heavy on anti - tank weapons. Salient
features of the plan are:-
(1) Phase 1. Five infantry divisions each reinforced with an
armoured brigade, portable SAMs and ATGMs to attack along five sectors each 5
to 6 kilometres wide. Destroy Bar-Lev Line
and repel any counter attack.
(2) Phase
2. The divisional bridgeheads
to penetrate depth of about 8 kilometres by H+14 to H+24. Each bridgehead of about 14 kilometres.
(3) Phase
3. By H+48, divisions to expand
laterally and close the gaps in five bridgeheads to make two army strength
bridgeheads.
(4) Phase-4
. H+72, two army bridgeheads
to expand laterally to form one armed forces bridgehead and also to penetrate
to 15 kilometres east of canal.
(5) Phase
5. Take up defence and beat
back the counter attacks.
(6) Surprise was the key factor and all
units to remain under air defence umbrella.
(7) Airborne and sea borne units to be
employed on large scale to neutralise enemy headquarters and delay their
reserves.
(8) 1 Army to remain in reserve west of Suez
Canal.
b. Israeli Plan. The Israelis had worked out an emergency plan
named “Shovach yonim” to cater for alarming situation erupting in Sinai. The
outline was: -
(1) Holding troops to foil any crossing
attempts and holds the Bar-Lev Line.
(2) Two armoured brigades to move up in case of
emergency.
(3) Stabilise the situation and carry out a
crossing and capture territory west of Suez Canal.
17. Golan Front
a. Syrian
Plan. The Syrian plan was to
recapture the lost territories in 1967.
To this end, the plan was:-
(1) The main effort of two infantry divisions supported by an
armoured division plus in area Kuneitra/Rafid to sever the Tapline and secure
area upto River Jordan including Bnot Yakov Bridge and Arik Bridge.
(2) An
auxiliary effort north of Kuneitra.
b.
Israeli Plan
(1) Hold purple Line with minimum force,
well protected by fortifications and mines etceteras.
(2) Defend Golan Heights at all cost, as a
strategic imperative.
(3)
On outbreak of
war, stabilise the situation and launch a counter attack.
CONDUCT OF OP
18. Syrian
Front
a. Syrian Offensive. Annex P
(1) Syrian launched two infantry
divisions (7th and 9th) and one mechanised division (5th) across the Golan
Line. There were two co-ordinated thrusts. One along road Damascus - Kuneitra
and the second one along Road Sheikh Miskin - Rafid.
(2) Left fork of Kuneitra column and
right fork of Rafid column were to capture Binot Ya’akov brigade the main
Israeli supply route on Golan River. This was Syrian’s main objective.
(3) 7th
Infantry division’s integral tank brigade got bogged down in the north due to
the strong defences and some administrative difficulties, difficult terrain and
effective defensive battle of Israeli 7th Armoured Brigade. The Syrian infantry
units, however, managed to cross the barrier and penetrate a few KM beyond
cease fire line.
(4)
In the south
comparatively more success was met and the Syrian broke through the
fortifications north and south of Rafid and drove along a number of axis.
(5)
Syrians
captured the Israeli OP at Mount Hermon position the same afternoon by a
heliborne commando assault.
(6) By afternoon 7 Oct, 1st Armoured
division was also launched in Rafid area. By the evening of 7th Oct Syrians had
reached 5 miles short of Binot Ya’ akov Brigade on Jordan River and within 2
miles of the escarpment overlooking the lake Tiberas. This was the farthest
point syrians reached. Logistic compulsions brought their advance to halt.
b. Israeli Counter Attack
(1) With
the arrival of reserves, the Israelis were in a position to launch counter
attack to regain the area upto the old cease fire line.
(2)
The counter
attack was launched on 8th Oct with two divisions, one in the south towards
Rafid and another in centre against Syrian salient in area Nafekh.by the end of
9 Oct IDF had returned to its original position in the north on ‘Purple Line’.
19. Egyptian Front
a. Egyptian Offensive
(1) Egypt
employed its 2nd and 3rd Armies in the main Assault on the Bar Lev Line. 2nd
Army operated north of great Bitter Lake and 3rd south of it, Bitter Lake being
including to 3rd Army.
(2) At 1400
hours 250 MIGs attacked targets from Bar Lev Line deep into Sinai. A tremendous
artillery planned fire immediately followed the strike by nearly 2000 guns and
rockets.
(3)
First wave of 800-assault
infantry crossed the canal from areas not covered by fire from Israeli positions.
The most remarkable feature of this crossing was that it was nearly continuous
along a front of 170 Kilometres.
(4)
As soon as the
infantry assault units had seized the area between Bar Lev Line strong points,
the engineers set about their task and in 6-8 hours had 50 ferries and 10
bridges operational. They had also opened up 60 gaps in the sand barrier using
floating water pressure pumps. This simple method to cut the rampart in a very
short span of time with little effort was innovative idea of a young Egyptian
engineer officer.
(5) Egyptian established bridgehead at five
different locations each by an infantry division. By 8th Oct the bridgehead of
division were unified so that they were continuous on each army front to a
depth of 10-12 Kilometres and at some places upto 18 Kilometres. Five infantry
divisions and about 500 tanks were already east of Suez. Their defence line was
an all arms team but foot mobile infantry armed with anti-tank weapons
continued to play an important role. In air duel Israelis had by then lost 150
of their 240 tanks.
(6) After the arrival of nearly three recently mobilised divisions, Israelis
launched a series of major counter attacks against the Egyptians. Due to
absence of mechanised infantry and lack of artillery and air support every
Israeli attack was repulsed with severe losses - probably exceeding 200 tanks
and more than 500 casualties in a few hours.
(7) No
serious attempt to dislodge the Egyptians was made after 9 Oct by Israelis.
b. Egyptian Attack to Support Syrians
(1) There
was increasing pressure on Egypt from Syria to launch an attack in Sinai that
would relieve Israeli pressure on her front.
(2) The two
Egyptian armoured divisions kept on the West Bank as reserve were moved across
the canal on 11-12 Oct. The attack was launched on 14 Oct. Elements of 2nd Army
were to capture Bir Gifgafa and elements of 3rd Army were to launch the attack
on Mitla and Giddi passes.
(3) By then
Israeli had learnt from their experience of battle of past few days and was well-integrated
in combined arms teams. By then IAF was also playing an increasingly effective
role in Sinai.
(4) Egyptian
2nd Army launched a disjoined attack. It advanced for about 8-10 Kilometres;
met heavy resistance was repulsed with heavy losses 150-200 tanks.
c. Operation
Gazelle - Israeli Counter Offensive
(1) Heavy
attrition suffered by Egyptian on 14 Oct reduced their tank superiority, at the
same time Israeli armoured units from Golan Heights and US sup air lifts
started arriving. This led the
Israelis to go ahead with their riposte.
(2)
General Sharon
immediately after his arrival on 7 Oct urged for an immediate effort to punch
through across the canal.
(3)
The crossing
site selected was just north of that Suez Canal’s entrance into the Great
Bitter Lake. This site also conceded with the boundary line between the
Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies.
(4)
The operation
commenced on 15 Oct. IST Armoured Brigade of Sharon’s division was launched on
right flank of 2nd Army. While the 2nd Brigade swung southwest towards the
great Bitter Lake and split into three groups. One group headed for the canal,
another to east to open Road Tsach - Bitter Lake (blocked by elements of 16
Infantry Division) and link up with Third Paratrooper Brigade and bridging
elements. The third group went north to secure the perimeter.
(5) By
midnight the link up had been achieved and by 0300 hours elements of Israeli
paratrooper brigade were across the canal encountering practically no
opposition.
(6) A major attack
under General Shazli comprising the Egyptian commando units, reinforced by the
weakened 21 Armoured Div on 20-21 Oct 1973 was abortive and severely mauled by
Israeli armour and TOW missiles.
20. Cease-Fire. Largely due to efforts of the Soviet Union the UN Security Council
imposed a Cease-Fire on 22 October.
Part III
ANALYSIS
Surprise
and Deception
21. Despite the development
of modern means of surveillance and intelligence, surprise, as a principle of
war is as applicable today as it was during Napoleon’s time. Egyptian initial
operation of crossing the canal and making bridgehead is an excellent example
of surprise at strategic and tactical level. When the wars are intense and
short the force which can assemble and achieve initial success can cause great
imbalance on adversary.
22.
The spring and early summer of 73
alarmed some of the Israeli senior officers. Again mil prep of Egypt was
extensive and intelligence officers knew secret transfer of 16 mirage fighters
from Libya to Egypt. General Ze’ira then
head of mil intelligence concluded that no fundamental change in Egypt’s
evaluation of its own capabilities had occurred. He suggested that by increasing
tension President Sadat was trying to improve the Arab bargaining position in
the private talks scheduled between Egypt and US and at the Nixon-Brezhnev
summit to take place in June. Accordingly, precautionary measures taken were
far short of prep for war. The army was put to extended alert, major
improvements to infrastructure and defence were undertaken and a very small no
of reservists largely technicians were mob. However in the early hours of 1 Oct
a report arrived that by 6 Oct Egypt and Syria would launch a full-scale attack.
Za’ire rep his conclusions at a meeting of General Staff next morning as
“Egyptian army had begun a large-scale multi-branch ex which was due to end on
8 Oct. Probability of attack is low”.
23.
Deception Measures by Arabs
a. Attack Time Schedule Kept Top Secret. The attack plan required at least a fifteen-day
period of prep, yet the beginning of the countdown was known to very few.
Planning staff agreed on the date for war in a highly secret meeting on August
22, 1973, but according to Egyptian chief of Staff, the commanders of Egyptian
2nd and 3rd Armies tasked with the crossing of the Suez Canal learned of the
war only on 1st Oct, divisional commanders on the 3rd Oct and Battalion
Commander and Coy Commanders on 5th Oct.
b. Even American Intelligence Agencies
Failed. Even the highly
pluralistic American Intelligence community did not predict the Egyptian and
Syrian attack, despite its access to overhead reconnaissance from Spy
Satellites, as well as other sources.
c. Even Soviet was not Info. According to Israeli sources, the Arab
high command held info even more tightly. The Egyptian did not plan to give the
Soviets much warning. They gave broad hints to Moscow on Oct 1 and an explicit
warning on Oct 3, only 3 days before war actually broke out on 6th. The
Egyptian did not set the actual hour of the attack until Oct 3, when war
Minister Ali visited Syria
d. Bluffed with Russian Advisors’ Return. When the Russian advisors returned home
in July 72, Israel’s belief was further strengthened that no attack was
possible as the Arabs could not handle sophisticated equipment.
e. Misleading Events
(1) On 13th
Sep 1973 an air battle erupted north of Israel’s border - when Syrian fighter,
attempted to attack an Israeli reconnaissance plane. One Israeli plane fell, as
did 12 Syrian planes. The Israeli thought the Syrian might retaliate for this
humiliating skirmish possibly a raid on Golan Heights. It was in this pretext that
Israeli Intelligence viewed the Syrian fwd deployment of their forces. When
similar development appeared on Egyptian front two explanations took place;
first that the Egyptians were merely preparing for an ex (Tahrir-41) that would
begin on Oct 1; Second Egyptians feared that war might break out as a result of
tension in the north.
(2) Incident
of Train Hijack in Vienna. On
Sep 29, 1973 a group of Palestinian terrorists con by Syria hijacked a train in
Austria carrying Jewish émigrés from Soviet Union Israeli High Command including
its media got bogged down in this incident and did not pay due attn to things happening
on their frontiers. Many in Israeli intelligence now believed that this episode
was part of the Arabs deception plan.
(3) Jordan civil war. The death of Nassar, the civil war in
Jordan and ultimately the apparent removal of the Soviet advisors by Sadat a
feeling developed in the Israeli defence establishment that a considerable
period of time would elapse before the Arabs would be ready for war.
f. Bluff. Egyptian, while continued there preparations for war on
the canal they however did every thing to bluff Israelis - The normal daily
routine - both by soldiers and companies continued without any change. Egyptian
soldiers continued to fish and to wander along the banks of the canal without
helmets, civilians continued their work as if nothing untoward was happening.
g. Reservists Mobilisation.
Disguising mobilisation of reservists as a peacetime activity played an
important role in deception plan of the Arabs. Only in the year of war
Egyptians had mobilised their reservists for 23 times. When they were mobilised
for war in Sep 73, Israelis took it as routine activity and thus did not create
any alarm in Israeli quarters.
24. Effect of Surprise. The
surprise achieved by Arabs was utter and complete. The success was beyond their
expectation too. General Shazli later
commented” We did not expect the enemy to be taken by surprise as easily as he
was”.
a. Surprise
achieved by Arabs was not limited till the start of the war only. There were a
number of aspects, which surprised the Israelis once the war started e.g.: -
(1) Rapid
construction of bridges and equally quick breaching of holes in Bar Lev Line.
(2) Proficiency
of Arabs and their technological competence in the use of sophisticated
weapons.
(3) The
tenacity and courage of Arab soldiers. They would face tanks at close range to
fire RPG-7 and expose themselves, therein lay the surprise.
(4) Effective air deviance umbrella.
(5) Employment
of anti-tank weapons in mass.
b. The
effects of surprise at strategic and tactical level were :-
(1)
Israelis were imbalance.
The effect was maximum till D+2 and the partial imbalance continued till D+5 or
D+6. Israelis could not mobilise their forces in time and in organised way.
(2)
The Israelis
could not move the regular forces in Sinai to the battle positions in time
thereby resulting in piece-meal and ineffective counter attack.
(3) Paralysis
of Israeli military commands all levels which resulted in slow and confused
reactions by Israelis for first 24-36 hours.
(4) Greatly
limiting the number of casualties suffered by Arabs in the initial stage of the
war. At one stage of the planning Egyptians were expecting the casualties to be
as high as 10,000 where casualties actually were few hundred only.
(5) On the
other hand there were unusually high losses of Israeli equipment and manpower.
A country which can not afford high rate of attrition particularly in manpower.
c. The
imbalance created by surprise was however restored when: -
(1) Israeli mobilisation scheme was
completed.
(2) Egypt
paused after bridgehead phase.
(3) Israelis
changed their tactics to deal with SAMs and ATGMs.
(3)
American arms
began to arrive
Lessons
25. Political Objective. Political objective must remain in harmony
with the prevailing environment. We see that in the war, Arabs had a limited
objective as compared to previous wars, i.e. they did not want to destroy
Israel, and achieved it to a great extent.
26. Surprise. Despite the developments taking place in
the modern means of surveillance and intelligence as a principle of war is as
applicable today as it was during Napoleanic time. The point of emphasis here
is that when the wars are intense and short the force, which can assemble and
achieve initial success, can cause great imbalance on adversary.
27. Intelligence. While interpreting the intelligence it is
more appropriate to rely on the capabilities of the enemy rather than his
intention. However accurate the intelligence reporting may be it can not make
up for the losses in assessment and initiation of action. Arabs gave numerous
indications about their impending offensive but Israeli High Command was obsessed
with the idea that Arabs were not ready to start the war and they suffered for this
lapse.
28. Limited War. In this aspect I will only emphasise that in
the modern limited war, preparedness and deployment during period of initial
tension counts a lot. If territory is lost in a limited war, in the same
context the value of bargaining position must be considered. If territory is
lost then it is necessary to seize adversary’s territory for bargaining
purpose.
29. Battle Field Intelligence. Communication from lower formation, continuous
feed back of information and its correct interpretation are vital. Egyptian
failure in this respect led to the Israelis establishing themselves on the
western bank and encircling the 3rd Army.
30. Modern Technology.
Technology of war is making
rapid progress. The education of soldier and the level of his technical skill
are gaining increasing importance.
31. Anti - Weapons. Light Anti tank and Anti aircraft missiles is
likely to be the favoured weapons of the future. However, tank and aircraft remain the primary
weapon of mobile war. New tactics for
their employment may be called for anti-weapons infested battlefield of the
future.
32. Evolving New Concepts
and Techniques
a. Simple
equipment thought of by Egyptian engineers to breach a hole in the Bar-Lev Line paid dividends out of
proportion.
b. The
point to emphasise here is that any progressive army must continuously adopt its techniques, concepts and doctrines in
relation to the changes being made by its adversary.
33. Air
a. Pre-emptive
strikes and destruction of aircrafts on ground is difficult in view of extensive
air defence measures being adopted.
b. In the
same context, the concept of absolute supremacy has lost much of its validity
as a result of the measures taken such as adequate airfields and landing strips,
adequate dispersion and fortification and efficient Air Defence.
34. Electronic Counter
Measures. Modern technology is
making an extensive use of electronics particularly in air defence weapon
system and surveillance devices. For
this reason defence and offensive aspects of electronic warfare would form an
important factor in the planning of any operation. A need exists for having a comprehensive
ever view of the adversaries weapon system during peacetime.
CONCLUSION
35. ‘73 Arab Israel War broke
the stalemate, which had existed in the Middle East for 6 years. The war changed many concepts. There was growing recognition that security
of a country is a product of multiple factors and does not only depend on
defensible borders. The war also proved
the soundness of age-old dictum that “Attack
is the best mean of Defence” and that no amount of ‘defensive posturing’ however brilliantly
conceived will win a battle or war.
63. The war should the dramatic
changes that technology can bring the battlefield and highlights the importance
of constantly adjusting the doctrine and concept without these changes. And more than any thing, the ‘73 Arab-Israel
War showed that inspite of technological innovations, the intangibles like
leadership, man’s motivation and training still count. “The
war will still be won or lost by men and not machines”.
This post was written by: Franklin Manuel
Franklin Manuel is a professional blogger, web designer and front end web developer. Follow him on Twitter
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