Tuesday, June 4, 2013

AIR POWER



 AIR POWER









            In the air are no streets, no channels, no point where  kone can  say of an antogonist  In the air, ll directions lead  everywhere.
                                                                                                                        H.G. Wells





THEME

            Air power came to its maturity during the second World  War.  The concept of air superiority and favourable air situation  were evolved  and   it   was establised that  air  superiority  was  a prerequisite for vistory in any land operation.  The  advancement of  aviation and weapn technologies has increased the  leathality and precision of airborne weapons.  The recent Gulf War is a true manifestation  of the potency and effectiveness of air power,  in foisy  warfare of contemporary times, where land and air  warfare have been fused into one medium to conduct fire and manoeuvre.







            ABSTRACT

            The  use  of  airpower in the  warfare  has  completely  the changed the concept of warfare.  Airpower alone considered to  be the winning factor in warfare.

            Various revolutionary aviators Doubt, Mitchell and Trenchard believed  the   use  of  airforce as  an  independent  force  not subordinate  to  ground or naval forces.  With the  wide  use  of airpower and their successful employment in various wars game the concept  of  favourable   air  situation,  air  superiority,  air supermacy and command of the air.  In past World War II era,  the airpower  extensively used in various com globelly especially  in Korean  War, Vietnam War, Falkland War. The Gulf War brought  new dimension  to  airpower. The success  konly continued  to  aerial warfare which brought the decisiove results, to make the war to a successful end.

            Air  power  in the context of  Indo-Pakistan  scenario  also brought useful results in both the hours of 1965 and 1971.  There is a significant rise in the development of airpower with  modren equippment  after  1971 war.  It is quite clear to say  that  air power  would dominate the warfare in any future conflict  between both the countries.

PREFACE

            In the study of airpower, evolution of airpower, its effects on warfare with particular reference to various campaign which is behaved that have had a particular significant for the  evolution of theory and practice between word war I and uptill 1982 including  the  conflicts between Pakistan and India in 1965  and  1971 War.

            This survey is not a complete record but rather a  selective study ranging from the important role of air power plays in  NATO strategy to the subcontinent environment.

            I  have  got assistance from air section in the  library  of Staff  College, Wing Commandeer Shamin and quoted from the  other writers are EMME, Air Vice Marshal R.A Mason, Maj Gen F.C Fuller,  Air  Marshal M.J Armitage RAF, Squadron Leader M.  Tariq  Qureshi and John Tricker.



List of Abbreviations
AWACS            -           airborne warning and control system
FEAF                -           Far East Air Force
NKAF               -           North Korean Air Force
NKPA               -           North Korean People's Army
ORBAT -           order of battle
SAC                 -           Strategic Air Command
SAM                 -           surface-to-air missiles
SAS                 -           Special Air Service
STOVL  -           short take-off and vertical landing
USAF               -           United States Air Force
USN                 -           United States Navy
VSTOL  -           vertical, short take-off and landing




CONTENTS

List of abbreviations

Introduction

Aim/Scope

Chapter  - 1.  Evolution

*           Evolution of Air Power

*           Classical theories of Air

*           Concept of German Blitzkreig and US strategic Bombing.

Chapter  - 2.  Effect of Air Power on Warfare.

*           Air Land Warfare

            -           Vietnam War.
           
            -           Korean War.

*           Air Sea Warfare.

            -           Falkland War.

*           Air Warfare.

            -           Gulf War.

Chapter - 3Subcontinent Environment.

*           Air Battle of 1965 War.

*           Preperation for another War.

*           Air Battle of 1971 War.

Conclusion

Bibliography

PART I
The Evolution of Air Power.
1.         Early history of mankind shows athat man always aspired   to fly.    The  winged  gods  of  ancient  legends   ware   romantil projections  of flights as demonstrated daily in mature  by  most birds  and sone insects.  Man remained earthbound.   However,  by the early nineteenth century, hot air ballons provided him with a relatively uncontrolled means of aerial navigation.    Eventually man  began his successful conquest of the air with  the  airplane and  powered  balloon.   On the morning  of  December  17,  1903, between  ten thirty-five A.m and moon two unkown  yound  brothers from  Dayton  `Ohio, Wilbur and Orville Wright made a  series  of four short flights in a powered airplane of their own design  and manufacture.  This was a key event and a key data to be impressed on  the mind, fot it will be remembered for ever ,  as  collumbus finding of the New World.

2.         Santos  Dumont,  was the first man to get off  the  soil  of Europe  in a Leavier .than -= aircraft in the fall of  1906.  The frenchman  Louis Bleriot, made the first  international  airplane flight  in  1909.  The hopped across the English  channel.   This flight  coupled  with a demonstration touw of Europe  by  Orville Wright  greatly stimulated public awareness of aviation  progress in  France Britain and Germany.  A year before. H.G  Wells  wrote the  War  in the Air (1908) , in which he foresaw  that  the  air power  of nations would revolutionize the conduct as well as  the social  consequences  of  war.  Wells considered air  war  to  be Universal  querrilla war, a war inestriccably involving  civilian and  homes and ll lthe apparatus of social life.  It was also  in 1909  that an Obs cure Major in the Italian army  Giulio  Douhet, write that the sky, too, was about to become another battle field no less important than the battle fiellds on land and sea.

Word War - I
3.         By 1212-14, German Zeppelins appeared as an "aerial meanace" in  the  eyes of Englishmen.  Rumours that German  Zeppelins  had flown  over  England  aroused  Widespread  concesu.   Because  of aviation,  in  1914 Englandhad obviously  lost  the  geographical immunity  which  the twenty odd  miles of water  in  the  English channel had provided since the Norman invasion in 1066.  With the actual  war  in  1914 leaders of all  the  warring  nations  were grappled with the movel problem posed by the rapid development of aerial  warfare.  The Royal Flying Corps of the Army  hasd   been dispatched  to  help  stem  the German  ground  tide  in  France.  Aircrafts  of  the Royal Navy based in France  destroyed  several Zeppelins  on their home bases in Germany.  It was thus that  the individual   relationship   between   offensive   and   defensive operations  in  air arfare was clearly  documented in  the  first weeks  of World War I.   To Britain, thereafter, the most  direct threat  to  its  security always laid in the  air.   When  German bombers  capaigned over London in 1916 -17, a  special  committee unequivocally   recommended  that  an  independent  airforce   by instituated  immediately.   In Jun 1918, an  independent  bombing force  was  created for direct action against the  heart  of  the German  indistrial system'  ultimately, an autXConous  Royal  Air Force  was  created in 1918.  This creation was to be  a  motable consequence  of World War I.  Military aviration  was  completely eradicated  in  Germany  after World War-I.   Denied  a  military airforce  Germans  atonce  turned  with  zeal  and  skill  to   a concentrated development of commercial air transport sport flying gliding  and  technical  development.  By  1926,  the  year  that Germany because a member of the League of Nations she was one  of the  leading  air  powers in  `Europe'.   This  development  also enabled Germany under Adolf lHitler to rearan rapidly in the  air after  1933.    After  Hitler  came  to  rule  in  Germany,   air rearmament  was initated without limitation.  With the rise of  a German airforce and with the mechanations of Mussolini Italy  and Imperial  Japan,  maked military force was  quickly  restored  to disturb  the  stability  of  word  peace.   Consequently  on  air armament  race  became  a control feature of the  "Cold  War"  in Europe from 1935 until the blitzkrieg on Poland in 1939.

Development of Air Power Sicne World War - II.
4.         The  "lightning  War" in Poland brought air  forces  to  the crest   of  world  opinion  regarding  the  actual  relities   of mechanized warfare.

a.         German Blitzkrieg in Poland.  Infact the shooting phase of  World War - II began with the German  Blizkrieg  in Poland.   Exhibiting  complete  tactical  surprise  the Luftwaffe demolished the polish air force on the ground and  blasted  in aout of the air within twenty  -  four hours.  The flexibility of superior air forces enjoying absolute  air  mostery  was next  demonstrated  by  the Luftevaffe in providing long -range firepower to  speed the advance of the aranoured and mechanized  spearheads of  the German army. While Britain and France  declared war,  dropped  pamphlets on Germany but  waited  to  be attacked in the wast, their ally poland was  completely occupied within three weeks. The entire non-Nazi  world was  stunned by the seemingly invincible power  of  the German  blitzkrieg employing the stantling  combination of  stukadine bombers and Panzer tank forces. The  role of  air forces in Europe, indeed was decisive  both  in the  early  German successescand  the  ultimate  allied victory. Command of the air was the pivot around  which the fortunes of the was in Europe revolved.

b.         Concept of Strategic Bombing. Strategic bombing the new technique  of  warfare which Germany ngelected  in  her years  of  triumps and which Britian and  America  took call to develop, may be defined as being an independent air  Compaign  intended  to  be  deisive  and  directed against the essential war-making capacity ofthe  enemy. Strategic bombing was these the first was instrument of history  capable of stopping the heart mechanism  of  a great industrialized enemy. Britian used the  technique of  strategic  bombing against Germany to  destroy  was industries/transport  and communications infact  -  the heart  and anteries of war economy so that enemys  will to  resist  was  broken through  nullification  of  his means.  Britian air leaders had this strategic  concept in mind at the beginning of the war but they locked the meant to carry it out. Their day light raids on  German industrial  targets  in 1940  resulted  in  prohibitine lasses. Accordingly the Royal Air force turned to night bombing, which was feasible, despite tge Luftwaffer air supermacy over Germany. The Britian developed the  most effective heavy night bomber the Lancaster, which  went into  action  in 1943 and remained  the  greatest  load carrier  of the air war in Europe. Infact , Mr  Winston Churchill wrote a memorandum on 3rd September 1940,  in which  he  openly accepted that 'The fighters  are  our salvation',  he said but the bombers alone provide  the means  of victory . We therefore, he said  develop  the power  to carry on ever - increasing volume of  experience to Germany so as to pulversie the entire  industry and  scientific structure on which the was  effort  and economic life of the economy depend. This was  strongly supported byt Lord Trenchard. a fanatical Douhetist who on 29th August 1942, wrote a powerful paper  advocating a cancentration of bombing to smash the German  machine of the bomber blitz.

c.         After  the Second Wrold War air power has  extended  an influence  so  permeating and deminating  that  it  has shaped  the whole course of internation affairs and  of any  future  war in particular. There  are  three  main factors which have influence the use of air power since the World War - II, these are :-
(1)        Nuclear  Weapons.  The  introduction  of   nuclear weapons gave an over whelming advantage to  offensive  air  power and this led  the  strategic  air striking  force  being  chosen  to  implement  the policy of defence through deterrence.
(2)        Emergence of Limited Wars. Although, the threat of general  war  has been contained by  a  policy  of deterrence, such factors as racial hatred etc have led  to  a succession of  disturbance  within  the context of conventional war. Air power has  played a  substantial part in suppressing  these  staying within  the necessary political restrictions.  The trend  of events has always been to use air  power for  rapid reinforcment or deployment of  security forces  on  a world wide and to  support  them  in battle.
(3)        Aircraft   and  Missile  Development.   Scientific progress  in military aviation widened  the  scope for using air power. Jet propulsion not only added to the power of the offensive buy was also the key to greater mobility, both in the peace time  movement  of forces and in the rapid reaction  of  air support  to contain emergencies. The  introduction of  air  and ground -  launched  missiles  further maintained the lead of offensive air power,  which will  continue  to make a  major  contribution  to national defence. The latest role of air power  in the Gulf war needs badly any explanation.
PART II

1.         The  use  of aircraft with the ground forces  and  the  navy brought  new dimensions in the carfare, besides acting  independently:-
a.         Air Land Warfare.
b.         Air Sea Warfare.
c.         Air Avorfore independent.
2.         AIR LAND WARFARE
Vietnam War.
The  history of us involvement in Vietnam preaccepted  a  complex picture.  It  was  the strength between the  capnlation  and  the communism. In December 1960, Ho Chi Much announced the  formation of Vietcong a national front for the liberation of South Vietnam. These events brought US forces in the shape of special forces. It was boncally to retaliate against Vietcong Gunlles operating from North Vietnam.

Role of US Air Force in Support of land Forces
1.         Tactical Air Power.Close Sp.
            In 1961, USAF canoeist of 117 aircrafts out of which 50 were combat  aircrafts and these streaght rose to 500 combat  aircraft in  1965.The  air  power used in support of  search  and  destroy operations  conducted by ground airforces. Forward Air  Conbotter were  used exlaistwiely, to operate in particular anise,  fanuliarie themselves and directing air power against the elusive enemy troops.

30% of total air effort were used for immediate or troops in contact situation 30. US 7th Air Force and Marine 1 Corps  colletinety flow an arrange 750 t0 800 Sorties per day in sp of ground forces.  At intake rate during surge operation, aircraft  sorties rate increased from 1.2 to 1.8 per day.

            In  all these operations, air power have used to  complement or replace artillery in support of ground forces.

            Tactical air power could swtihed its effort rapidly from one sector to another and could concentrate massuie fire power within a short period near a limited geographical area.

            AC - 47 aircrafts were used to illuminate taugch with floras for night attacks. AC-30 joined later with advanced saucer system to  7th  Air Force. By using tow light  television  and  inflated detectors,  the aircraft could locate targets, direct fire  power on  them and also mak target acenrately for follow up attacks  by tactical aircraft.

Strategic Use in Tactical Role
            Use of B-52 "The flying fortran" in close support of  ground forces  was the major invocation of the airway in South  Vietnam. B-52  were basically designed to carry the quell weapons and  was under  control of strategic Air Command. These were employed  for mass destruction and were underfield to carry agate four 500  lbs bounds on long pylons total bowbload of 100,000 lb. On equivalent of  fine fighter powers. The sorties were raised from thirty  per day to sixty per day at the time of Tel Offensive.
Interdiction Compaingin
Interdiction  compaigin  was started from 1965 to 1968  lines  of communication  against North Viethenes. In included attached  are rculway system, especially between the luic segment between china and Stunt. The whole stretch was covered with SAMS, AA  artillery defence. Two bridges were us war battle needs. One of the  bridge was  targeted  and made  out of action for seven weeks  with  one railway  and two road span destroyed. With the  result,  logistic problem was faced by the enemy.

            Forty mile rail segment between Haiphong and Hanor was  also vital  to north Vietnamese logistics, because belt of  goods  including fuel and food tranelled from Hippies Harbor. Third important  segment  was from Hanoi to Vie. All these  lug  have  under constant bomlandment by the USAF and North Vietnamese were unable to flow their logistics through these weans.

KOREA WAR
1.         The was started on 25th June 1950 when North Korea  attached South Korea. The UN Security Council called on North Koreaers  to withdraw behind 38th Parlayed, but when they failed to do so,  US forces have committed under UN authority.

2.         Role of Air Power
a.         Air Superanany.   On 1 July, the US force begin is were its force by air and sea blockade was complemented.  On 2  July 1950, the air offensive started by B-29  Bowhes air  Yanpu  airfield near. Humguam Where  most  of  the North  Korea aircrafts were used. Later Caribbean  aircrafts also found in this counter air operation. By end of  July are but handful of enemy aircrafts  have  been destroyed worry on ground.

b.         Close  support, interdirction and Air Suply.  With  the destruction  of North Korean aircrafrts, the  operative for  close  supoort for ground  forces  started.  Total Number of fire close interdiction ha ed 1,2,3,4, and  5 compauge  and  operation strangh were  started  against bridges,  raily and rol communication net  work.  These pronad  beway  on  resources,  and  number  of   bowker aircrafts  have  lost.  Deep  interdirction  compraigin  started  aginst the North Koera,s caprital  because  of number  of  logistic instattations and  logistic  bars. Hydroelectnic   plants  and  power  transmission   grid stations  have  attached.,  to put  prusmum  umpon  the conmunits.  This compaigin strated with  1254  sontries per day.

                      To put pohtical presum still  irrigation dams were made  the  target  sithated  near  important  transport routes  in  North West Koera, providing 75  percent  of water for the country,s rice production. Out of  twenty daius from were made the targets.

                      Tactically these strikes brough spectacutar result with  why are dam, North of Pyonsyany,  destroyed  five bridges near by railway line, flooed five square  miles of  rice, damaged six miles of embonbwnt and  unindated sunan airfield.

                      Close  support by  FEAF desewed to exist but  provided  by  Task Force 77 )Navy) to land  forces.  These were  pre-brief  strikes  by  concentrated  air  effort delwared our a shost period on tragets beyond bonb line source twenty miles ahead of most forward ground  positions.  These humions were called Cherokee Miniion  and contanced tell the end of the war.

                      The  USAF employed alone secuceten wings  deployed in  direct support of fighting during the year 1952,  a force that encluded three wings of B-29, seven  fithers wings,  two B-26 wings a recomnaissance wing  and  four troop Carrier wings. Over one million sorties had  been flow by the UN air force.

Air supply and Air euachalion
Two warine regiments and one regiment of 4th Infantry durion were to be in danger of being cut off by six chinese duision in November 1950. Task force 77, and Ist North Air Wing frraided all  the closed  support  needed for them lohite FEAF,s combat  Air  Cargo Command dealt with the demands of air supply to threatmned  units for  wearly two weeks, air supply of 1580 tons was provided to  a force roughly a division.



GULF WAR
            Great Britim united States and nine other nations  respaided to  Saudi  Aratia's request for aid in Agust 1990,  in  the  most extensive projection of air power civ history. On 7th August, the coalition had 323 fixed wing conmsat and support aircrafts.  This strength rose to 2430 on January 17th and finally 2790  aircrafts by Febraury 24th.

            This  war showed the complete superancy of airpower  in  the air and later command in the air was achieved, sure Iraq.

            The  aircompaigin had four phases.
            Phase  1.  To  destroy  Irq  Vital  centres  of   grairtyits defensive and offensive air capbilities, including the entire Air Force  and  its intigrated ground based air defence  system;  its nabonat  commniation including television, radio and land  lines; its   accleur  biological  and  chemical  weapons   reserch   and production  capabilities;  system  including  the  railroads  and bridges and oil  distribution and transportation capabilities.

            Phase II and III.           To nentratise Iraqi Army in the  Kuwaiti theatre of operation (KTO) by cutting bridges and lines of communications  to  disrupt its resupply, destroyed  its  arnower  and artillery, killing and deanoralizing its personnel.

            Phase  IV.    To  wire  air/ground  compaigin  by   providng intelligence, manive firepower as needed and protective  aircover for friendly ground force.

            In this compaigin coabtion air power performed all the roles that coued be consigned to it namely counter air operations,  Air recomn airance, deep interdiction, close support and air lift.

Counter Air Operation
            Before  the lobr Iraqi Air Force flow about 100 sorties  per day  including  60 comat aircarft sorties per day.  Ouring  first week  of  war, Iraqi lost 17 aircrafts in air to air  combat,  18 fled  to fram. Total comes to 35. Conlition suffered no loss.  It is estimated that 227 aircrafts of Iraq were destroyed on  grond. The  conlition gained total air superiosity in the first week  of the war.

            The compaigin started with stealth F 117A aircrafts  reduced pilot  exposure  over  heairly defended  targets  and  especially during day light hours and F0117A flow virtually undedected.

            Iraq decided in order to same lito airpower made them fly to fran  out  of which 115 were cmbat aircarfts and 33  the  custian transport.

            Within four days of the start of war, counter Air  Compaigin had  drmin the Iraqi Airforce into hiding. Iraqi  integrated  air defence system effectively destroyed.

            Interdiction and close Air support omissions. Supply  dumps, SAM sites, artillery and silkworm missiles silis were  constantly attached by Jaguars (Deep penetration low level flying aircraft). Jaguars also proved extremely effective in attachs against  Iraqi naval targets, patrol boats and landing crafts. Over has  sorties were flown for these missions.

Air Reconnaiosance
            Tranado  GRIA  was  the first reconainance  aircraft  to  be equpped  with  rideo recarding sensous and  provide  a  day/night reconainance capability. Some 140 sorties were flown on  tactical reconanisnace  mission,  mainly operated in pairs at  low  level. These  sorties operated over extended period over enemy  territoy against supp;y routes enemy positions, sand mobile onesite lanchers and bridges for damage assessmant after laser guided  bombing raids.

Naval Air Operation
            Carrier based aircrafts also used for strickes against those targets which were  clom to them. In mid Tanuary, the striks flew against  Iraqi held islands and oil platforcus thjat  were  being used to spy on coolition ships and to five at coalition aircraft.

THE FALKLAND WAR
1.         The confhit started over falkland islands between  Argentina and united kingdom. In  April 1982. The falkland flas of falkland was 400 miles away from Argentina and 8000 mils away from  United Kingdom  and was under llnion Jack. These islands were pro   clamied by Argentina the heir of all spanish claims in the region.

2.         The  hostitities broake out on 02 April 1982 in  a  combined air and sea opration an estimated force of 5000 Argentina  troops was landed at falklands which they captured 3 hours later.  South Georgia  was captured by Argentina on 03 Aprial 1982.  The  first stage of the was over.

3.         Difficulities of England & Argentina :-

a.         The  Falkland Island were 8000 miles away from  England and with no friendly basis in the Vicinity. The British troop carrying aircrafts. (c-130) didnat have the range to fly to Falkland and back without refuelling.

b.         The unibalance between Argentina and British air power. There only 22 Sea starrier jomp jets aboard the  carriers  HMS Hermes and HMS Invinciable. argentina orer  of battle  included seventeen Mirage III air defence  aircraft  sixty eight A4P Skyhawk and eleven  A4Q  Skyhawk attack  aircraft, twenty six Mirage V attack  aircraft, seven   Canberra  B-62  bombers,  five   naval   saper-Etendards,  Six S-2 Tracker aircraft  for  recomaisance and two KC 130 air to air refuelling tankers. (Falkland company, Air Pam the njmber age  P205.

c.         Sea Harriers have a short range and subsonic speed  and can  attack  250 miles away and  straight  comeback  to their  carrier,  where as Argentina Mirage  III  has  a combat radivs of 600 miles

d.         The Argentina Navy was too old almost obsolete,  therefore it comd neither match nor oppose British Navy. The burden of cover was on Argeattive Air force.


e.         None  of  the  crew of aircrafts  had  apparenlly  been trained in night operationed. Super standard  aircrafts were not trained to operate from the Agrentina aircraft career.  Argentina services were not well  exercised  n close  coordination  that joint operation of this  kind demand.

f.          The  only air base available to British forces  in  the South Affantie was Ascension Islands 400 0 miles

AIR OPERATION
a.         Long Range Bombing & Air Refuelling.   On 1 May, before dawn  the first of several long range attacks  on  Part stanley  airfield by Vulcan Bombers was  launched  from Ancession  Islands. This was supporded by chain  of  11 victor air to air refuelling tankers for its 8000 miles round flight to the Falklands and back. This flight and subsequent  ones  were to longest  overmade  by  bomber aircraft in the history of air power.

b.         Air  power vs naval ships. Due to abscence of  Argentia Navy, only the airforce was in offensive role.  Despite navy  damages,  Argentina  contince  to  press   attach against Bristish. Naval sash force On 4 May, D destroyer  HMS shefficed was destroyed by an air ttack. On  21 May  two  HM ships, Andent and Arggonant  were  severly damaged by bombs and Ardent later sank. On 23 May,  two were  ships  have  attacked and one  canght  fire.  HMS conventy  sank on 25th may. Contancier  ship  "Aflantic Comeyer"  was  hit, caught five and abondaned.  On  7th June, HMS plynonth was damaged by a bomb, same day  HMS Sir Galahad was attacked and caught on fire.

c.         Counter  Air  Operations.  Contineous  attacks  by  Sea Harriers  and Valcan Bombers throughout  the  compaigin against the air fields of Port S standley Race  course, pebble Island and Goose Green and later deprived Argentina Air Force to use then.

Air Superionty
            None of the airforces achieve and superionty throughout  the compaigin. Aircrafts of both the forces penetratea the  defensive of eachother inspite of heavy fire and sucessfully conducted  the operation.

a.         Tac  level, Harriers demous trated the ability  of  air power to switch its efforts from one  target to  another;  from  the ruaway of at Port  Stanley  airfield  to Argenaitna supply ships running the blockade or to  the interception of incoming air attacks.

b.         At  operational level, airpower shaved its capacity  to adopt to the umgie circumstances of a totally unexpected  theatre  of operation. Ageing Victor  tankers  were modified for the pholographic reconnainance and  transporters were modified as air to air refuelling  tankers and receuines.

c.         At strategic level, the compaigin demoustrated how  the resources  of airpower that had been designied for  war in specific and unclear environment of Europe and North Affantic  could  switch  over the thrust  to  meet  the totally  different  circumstances  of  a  converntional compaigin for which no preperations were made and which was fought at the far end of opposite hainphere.

            The  compaigin demoustrated three importang  frrix appeies of air power:

(1)        First  the  importance of secure air base  in  the treatre of operation. Britishes initially had none in the area of operation. The only secure air base use  the  Ancession Island 4000  miles  Northe  of Falkland. The Argentina Air Power had safe base in the  beginning  at Falkland but  cater  they  were compelled    to  operate  from  share  bases,   at Argentina.

(2)        Second, the flexibility, which can produce  operational   effectiviness  acron  a   broadfield   of capabilities. In this case, the key factor was air to  air refuelling. This capbility  made  possible vitual  air drops to the flect by  transport  aircraft, operating well beyond the normal radies  of actions it facilitated the air reinforcement of an aircraft  carrier at extrence ronge;.  It  enabled Victor aircraft modified for the photographic  and marifine  reconnaissance roles to  area  Agrentina disposu  Ground South Georgia, it also shanea  the demoustration of air power in attacking  Angentina garrison on Falkland by Valcan Bombers.

(3)        Third, the flexibility of air power at each of its three levels, tactical, operational and strategic. The  compaigin  also share the  supermacy  of  air power our the maritive power. Argentina air  Force inspite of strong air defence by the British naval ships penetrated and cause considerable damage  to the  British Navy. 12 warships, 3 LSLs and 2  Merchant  ships were damaged. 4 Warships, 1 LSL  ship and  1  Marchant ship were such by  Argentina  Air Force.




PART III
SUBCONTINENT ENVIRONMENT
1.         During  Rann of Katch skirmishes, PA was not fully  involved but  it  checked  it state of readiness  by  conducting  Exercise Desert  Hawk, which brought all PA on warfooting. The weak  areas had been spotted and suitably reanedied. The war plans of the PAF were  exercised  and tested commanders got a first  hand  advance knowledge  of the problmes and difficulties likely to be  encountered in the event of an all out war. Positioning of personal and suadrons had taken place, and the people became mentally prepared to  meet the enemy Exercise Desert Hawk was a certain  raiser  to the September war.

2.         The  first  exercise took place with IAF  on  1sr  September 1965,  over  Chamb Sector and four Vampers aircraft  were  brough down.  this  first encounter brought the morale  down  of  Indian troops and Vampers were vamished from the air.

OUTCOME OF THE AIRWAR 1965

3.         The  overall ratio between PAF and IAF was 1:5. PAF  was  on the  offensive  right from outset inspite of being  inferiors  in numbers to IAF. PAF gained air superiority in first four days  of war. The operations were switched over to close support to  Pakistan Army over a threatre stretching from Chamb to Rajistan.  PAF took  full  cognizance  of IAFs much larger  fleet  and  superior quality of aircraft and prepare its aerial strategy to offset the advantage.
4.         Indians  had too much faith in their  numerical  superiority and they underestraiated the fighting capability of PAF. IAF  air superiority  newly  inducted aircraft MIG -21 were  developed  in first  offensive strike of PA at Pathankot. IAF resorted to  harrassing and hurring tactics which invested disaster F 104 due  to its  high  speed and F 86 Sabre due to  its  high  maneovrability could catch up fleering Hunters and Gnats. 

PAF Losses
            Total PAF losses between 1-23 September 1965 which were also confined by the US military Assistance Advisory Group were staked to  comprise thirteen F-86, Two F-104, were lost as a  result  of air  combat.  IAF losses by various sources which  collected  the data caure to 75 aircrafts in September 1965.

1.         PREP FOR ANOTHER WAR
            After  1965  war, India had engage in procurement  are  over  the workd to have another encounter with Pakistan.
2.         At the outbrake of 1971 war, IAF numerically recover the 5th largest in the world, in terms of quality of equipment, it was No 4.  It processed a variety of almost one thousand advanced  front leve  of  aircrafts and developed highly comprained  air  defence system. 

3.         I possessed a sophisticated network of early warring and low level  radars   which   gave  the IAF an  ummeuse  offensive  and defensive capability.

4.         The  growd  defences were supported by rapid  fireing  radar countrolled gens and surface to air mesiles.

5.         The  aircrafts   were  widely  dispersed over a  nuclear  of airfields  deep in the interior, many  of which were  beyond  the reach of PAF aircrafts.

6.         Forward air bases had concrete structures (peas) for housing aircraft.

7.         India   had   developed   indigenous    infrastructure   for manufacture and assembly of planes;

8.         Its  aeronautical engineering had made  major  advancements, and there was a steady production of all types of fighter planes, ensuming for the IAF a tremendous reserve capability.

9.         India  had learnt the lessons from thir defeat of  1965  war and  had   effected  improvements  in their training  and  combat tactics.

SIT AT PAF
1.         USA, over main source of supply, had placed and enlargo;  no new  type of aircraft could be procured and supply of spares  too was stopped.

2.         There  was  requirement of hight cintercaptor.  A  deal  was made  with Chua to supply Mig 19 (recovered by the PAF  as  F-6).  Mirage III was selected as a high performance aircraft but due to high cost, few planes could be procured.

3.         Some  improvement  was made in ground defences and  the  air defence  capability.   Rwaways  were  developed  and  statellites established.   The rapid firing guns supplied by China  added  to the ground defence of the basis.

War of 1971
1.         The  classical theory of defence of East Pakistan was  based on  strategy that an attack in the East from India would  mean  a receprocal attack from Pakistan in the West.

2.         PAF out of her limited resources, placed only one  squaddron in East Pakistan.

3.         The  strategy was yet to be fiwabsed the  following  options were aval:-

a.         To launch an offensie on IAF bases.
b.         To go for intensive ground support of Pakistan Army.
c.         To face on the defensive and sort out IAF over its  own shares.

4.         The limitation  of PAF :-
a.         The PAF did not have aircraft pene_______  deep into en territory.   Mirage  III  were few and  canot  be  used freely  as an offensice. IN order to be successful  had to suffer certain losses.

b.         With the rewaral of East Pakistan demount from the PAF, shortags  were experienced in manpower,  especially  in the fields of airccrew and technical trades.
c.         Some  East Pakistan airforce personnel went out to  the Indian  side  and comprohoused  classified  information about Pakistan's air defence.

d.         Mig  19  (F-6) was inducted for air defence  and  close support roles, but not all aircrafts had been  modified to  carry air to air mesiles.  This was a  handicap  in air  combat.  The radius of action of these planes  was low,  giving  them  very  short,  duration.   The  F-6, therefore  could   not  play  an  effective   role  lof close support.

e.         The   concept  of  close  support  had   not   received sufficient attention at the joint army - airforce level and it was thus a vague option open to the PAF.

f.          PAF had established sstellites (small bases) but had no air compount of aircrafts and could nto commi itself to any major role without knowing the real designs of  the enemy.

h.         Pakistan  Governments  war policy was not  clear.   The likely  duration  of  war, over  own  objectioves,  the extent  to  which  PAF  could  commit,  all  this   was undecided  and  allowed  very little room  for  PAF  to manoeuvre.

            PAF  in this total situation of confusion prevailing adopted priority of self preservation.

OUT BREK OF 1971 WAR

            The  war in the air fought over the shees of East  and  West Pakistan on 22nd November 1971.

East Pakistan 
1.         The war statiooned in East Pakistan before 3rd December  71. Only  one  F-86  sqn  (sqn -14) was  stationed  at  Dacca.   This squadron  had to face ten squadron comprosing of Mig  21s,  SU-7, Ghats  and  Hunters.  It was no war situation  but  the  squadron fought even the runway had been cratered.  The pre__________  air of  this small dedicated group of PAF personnels was to same  the Dacca Air Field.

a.         En  Superiority  in Numbers.  Main obj of  IAF  was  to destroy Dacca Air Field in order to incapable the No 14 squadron.   Initially they failed to achieve and  heavy casualties were inflicted on the raid.  The Ghants  and Hunters forced ineffective against F-86.

b.         EnSuperiority in High Performance Aircraft.  India thre a  large number of new supersonic aircrafts  MIG-21  in the  struggle  and  on 8th Dec enter  Dacca  Air  Field because  unoperative,  but eleven F-86  sabres  remains vitact.
West Pakistan Scene
2.         Air  was  started in 3rd December 1971, India  employed  the __________  in the West pub failed.    PAF launched an  offensive on  the  forgetting the Indian Air Base at  Palhamhot,  Amritsar, Avantipura, Srinagar, Ultartai, Agra and Ambala.  IAF  retabiated against.   PAF in great strength.  The main objective of IAF  was to destroy PAF and therefore  IAF tried to strike each and  every base, including the staellites and emrg enemy airships but little damage  was  caused.   IAF  a good  employement.   IAF  help  the pressure for three days - 4th, 5th and 6th December.

3.         On  7th  PAF  strile  back.  IAF  changed  the  tactics  and targetsIAF   started  attacking  cities  and  areas  of   cujhian population.   These  raids wer aimed to lower the morale  of  the people but of no so strategic value.

4.         PAF  due  to auscutable aircrafts could not give  ful  close support  to  ground forces.  Where as Indian  surtched  over  the Squadron from Eastern sector.  IAF has planning of aircrafts  and pilots in reserve.

5.         The was came to an end on 16th December.  Total losses  were not  more  than  15 aircrafts.  The  entire  strength  of  Mirage squadron was unscalhed.

Overcome of War
1.         Indian  lost a good deal of aircrafts in 1st phase  of  war, due  to  wrong employment of aircrafts against  the  targets  and offensive launched by PAF.

2.         Due  to paucity of aircrafts, enterciption was  checked  but radis against civilian population of Lahore and Karachi could not be completely stopped.

3.         There  was  not strategic aim of IAF  regarding  attacks  on civil population.

4.         IAF  supported well in close support to its  ground  forces, for which she was full preperation, IAF had pleanty of  aircrafts for this role.

5.         Indian had a big advantage in number of aircrafts.

6.         PAF checked the untrusion of IAF to the maximum possible.

7.         IAF could not destroy the PASF therefore unable to guarantee the  favourable  air situation to India Army.  Indian  Army  gave away move aubitious plans.

8.         PAF  by persuing itself as a detercrant of IAF, the pite  of East Pakistan Sector came to standstall.






Glossary

Air superiority.  The ability to exercise sufficient control over particular airspace at particular time as to be able to carry out one's  own  air operations effectively with little  or  no  enemy interference while, at the same time denying the same opportunity to him.

Air supremacy.  Usually indicates a broader and longer degree  of control  of airspace and would tend to be associated with a  campaign  and theatre of operations rather than a single or  limited engagement.

Close  air support.  Used to describe air attack on enemy  ground forces  which  may actually be in contact  with  friendly  ground forces.

Combat air patrol.  Describes the mounting of standing patrols by armed interceptors across the potential tracks of intruding enemy aircraft, or in the vicinity of a particular target area.

Combat radius.  The combat radius of an aircraft is the  distance which  it can fly from its base, complete its operation  activity and return to base.  An alternative expression may be  `operation radius' and both expressions should be distinguished from `range' which  usually  signifies a single journey between  two  separate points and may or may not include the carriage of weapons.



Command of the air.  Denotes the absolute control of airspace, as opposed  to the more limited concepts of air superiority  or  air supremacy.

Counter-air  operations.  Designed to achieve air superiority  or air supremacy by attacking the infrastructure of enemy air power, notably his airfields, but including command, control  communication, radars and air defences.

Interdiction.  The use of air power to sever supply links and  to dislocate,  disrupt or destroy resources moving along  them,  between an enemy's rear areas and the battlefield, Thus battlefield interdiction `would imply air attack close to the actual   combat area, while deeper interdiction would imply longer-range  attacks on roads railways, bridges, etc.

Maritime  operations.  All air activities associated  with  naval forces are referred to as `maritime operations'.

Stand-off.     Refers to an aircraft"s ability to launch  air-to-surface  weapons  some distance from the  actual  target  instead actually over-flying the target to drop `free-fall' weapons.



Introduction

1.         The  twentieth century has seen the face of warfare  changed by  the exploitation of `the third dimension' of the skies.   The first manned flight as KittyWawk USA in 1903 has brought  revolution in the warfare.  It was a small flight of few seconds but  a giant  leap for markend.  Between the pioneering  achievement  of Wright  brothers and the destruction of Japanese city.  Hiroshima by one bomb from a single aeroplane the role of science of flight in internation affairs sketched in hold outline.

2.         After  world war II, airpower emerged with  ever  increasing prominence as an instrumentality o the statecraft and strategy of nations.  USA emerged as the most powerful nation with overwhelming  aerial superiority.   USA successfully use the advantage  of her airforce in dominating the policies of other nations  golbally.   Now  every  country desires to have a  strong  airforce  to safeguard her fronters.  Air power is also being used as a deterrence and composing the will of a country on others.

3.         It is probable that in twenty first century, the space  will become  the  high  ground to be seized and  either  commanded  or denied  to the adversary, i.e the future battlefield for an  airwarfare, ie space warfare.

Aim.  The aim of the research to carry out the study of evolution of  air power, its effects on warfare with special  reference  to over environment.

Scope.  The scope of this research paper encompasses the  following aspects:-
a.         Evolution of airpower.
b.         Tactical theories and concepts before World War II.
c.         Significant role of air power in World War II.
d.         Various  ___________    warfares  in  support  of  land forces, _______ power and acting independently.
e.         Indo - Pakistan Scenario wars of 1965 and 1971.
f.          Future of air power.

Role of Air Power
            The  roles in which the airpower is used in support  of  National Defence Policy are the following :-
a.         Strategic Air Strikes.
b.         Air Defence.
c.         Tactical.
d.         Air Transport.
e.         Air Reconnaissance.
f.          Maritive.




Selected Bibliography
1.         Major General J>F>C Fuller, the conduct of War 1789-1961.
2.         Emme, the impact of Air Power.
3.         M.J  Arnitage  and R.A Mason, Air Power in the  Nuclear  Age 1945 - 1982.
4.         Air Vice Martial R.A Mason, War in the Third Dimension.
5.         Bruce.  W. Watson, Bruce George, Peter Tsouras and B.L  Cys, Military Lessons of the Gulf War.
6.         Toha Tricker Battle for Pakistan 1965 War.
7.         Syed Shabbir Hussain and Squadron Leader M. Tariq Qureshi.
8.         College  of  Staff Studies Pakistan Air Force ISSC -  I  Air Operation Exercise No 1.
9.         College  of Staff Studies, Pakistan Air Force ISSC - II  Air Operation Exercise No. 2.
10.        Air Power study command and staff college Quetta 1986  Staff Course.
11.        Falkland War GHQ Training Note.
12.        Encyclopedia America.


ABSTRACT

            In  the  study  of air power, the emergence  of  air  power, starting from the first flight of an aircraft by Wright  brothers in  190 to th use uptill word war II.  The concepts of and  theories  of  various  prologonists of air power  which  are  Douhet, Trenchard  and  Tedder.  Various mode of  strategies  applied  by Allied and Germans, have been studies.

            The  role of air power and its effects has been carried  and air  power being operated independently in various  conpaign  has been highlighted.

            The  air  power  is also studied in the context  of  Indo  - Pakistan  scanrio, their effect, the use and outcome of  the  war are pen down.

            In  the  end, airpower prove to the only  significant  power which can change the diplomatic relations between the cou____ and being the immediate _______ results.



0 Responses to “AIR POWER”

Post a Comment

Translate

All Rights Reserved ALL MILITARY | Blogger Template by Bloggermint