Tuesday, June 4, 2013
BATTLE OF TOBRUK(1941)
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BATTLE OF TOBRUK(1941)
ROMMEL’S PERSONALITY
1. Few gens in
their lifetime have had as many words written about them as had Fd Marshal
Rommel. There was nothing striking about Rommal’s physical appearance.
He was of med ht and the only characteristics feature of his rather open face was a blunt, determined jaw. In the first world war Rommel, as a jnr ldr, had won the highest German decoration for valour. His personality induced an apprehensive fascination in his adversaries and an almost religious loyalties in his own men. He was worshipped by the fighting tps.
He was of med ht and the only characteristics feature of his rather open face was a blunt, determined jaw. In the first world war Rommel, as a jnr ldr, had won the highest German decoration for valour. His personality induced an apprehensive fascination in his adversaries and an almost religious loyalties in his own men. He was worshipped by the fighting tps.
2. As per
Churchill, “we have a very daring and skillful opponent against us in Africa
and I may say, across the havoc of war, a great gen”. Gen von Mellenthin
describes him as the most daring and trustful comd in German mil history.
3. Rommel
never minced his words. He possessed great moral courage.
4. Rommel’s
skill in twice driving the British back to the Egyptian frontier, and his
elusiveness in evading annihilation when the British struck back, gained for
him his unparalleled fame as master tactician.
BACKGR/GEO POLITICAL SIT
1. By autumn
of 1940, all Western Europe except for Spain, Portugal and Greece had become
Axis con. The British possessed Egypt, the Near East, the Island of Malta,
which was the pivot of the Mediterranean, and Gibralter, which dominated the
Western end. The master key to con of the Mediterranean was the Island of
Malta. This lay ninety miles south of Sicily and plumb across sup routes to
Italian possessions in Tripoli and Cyreniaca.
2. Mussolini
had been watching with growing fury how history was being made without him. The
exits, the straits of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal, were firmly in British
hands, as was the heavily armed rocky island of Malta, which lay across the
route to Italy’s North African colony of Libya. Ethiopia and the neighboring
Italian Somaliland were virtually cut off and could be reached only by air via
the Sudan.
3. In the Balkans, which in the duce’s view
were clearly his sphere of interest, frontiers had begun to mov without Italy
getting any of the benefit, and what was worse, Germany was developing more and
more into the dominant power.
4. Already during the western campaign (the
timing could hardly have been a coincidence), Stalin had started by making his
ally pay up. Romania must give up Bessarabia, ceded by Russia under presure
after the First Word War. After briefly hesitating, Hitler agreed.
5. Bulgaria and Hungary likewise had
territorial demands on Romania. Nobody bothered anymore to consult France and
Britain which, together with Turkey, had guaranteed Romania’s frontiers by
treaty. Turkey declared herself neutral. The German Reich played the kindly
uncle at Romania’s exp. The signature of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count
Ciano, beside Ribbentrop’s under the Vienna Award, which made new disposns on
these frontier questions, had the air of a trifling gesture of consideration to
a poor relation.
6. In these circumstances the Duce should
conc his efforts against Britain perhaps he could attk the small gar in Egypt
from Libya. The Idea had in any case occurred to Mussolini already, but his
Comd in Chief in Libya, Marshal Graziani, had proved unbelievably refractory.
On paper, the chances did not look bad. After the defeat of France he was
relieved of the obligation to gd Libya’s western border against French Tunisia
and had 215,000 men under arms facing 36,000 British. But the Marshal appeared
to have an extremely realistic est of the fighting powers of his men. He kept
postponing the start of the offensive he had given ordered to launch.
6. Finally
Mussolini ordered the attk to start on 13 Sep 40. Otherwise, Graziani was
fired. “Never has a mil op been carried out so much against the wishes of its
comd,” wrote Ciano in his diary.
Problems
Faced by Rommel at the Start
a. Log ie sup of ammo & POL.
b. Luftwaffe in
Africa was not subordinate to the Africa Corps. As a result fighter and gr
strafing gps were used strat rather than in tac sp of Rommel’s force.
c. Libya, being
the Italian territory, was under the dir con of Italian High Comd. German were
there to asst them.
Italian
Weaknesses
a. Their inf were
prac without A tk wpns.
b. Their arty
completely obsolete.
c. Offrs thought
of war as little more than a pleasant adventure.
British Weakness
a. Non-aval of mob
maint units.
b. Lack of trained
staff and comm facilities.
THEME
The def of
Tobruk proved that even in a terrain as the desert a skilful comd could hold
his en in defensive operations. Wavell had applied the concept of offensive def
to meet the German onslaught. On the other hand Rommel has been criticised for
his reckless push, little caring for the requisite log sp which becomes even
more crucial in the inhospitable desert terrain.
Carry out
an analysis of the battle of Tobruk bringing out the strs and weaknesses of
Wavell's concept of def and causes of Rommel's failure.
BATTLE OF TOBRUK(1941)
Background
1. Between the summer of 1941 and that of
1942 the field of battle in the Libyan desert shifted to and fro with almost
the regularity of a pendulum, or so it seemed. The extremes of the swing were
from Mersa Brega in the west and Buq Buq to the east, except for the small
stretch of Egyptian territory east of Sollum, the area between these two places
covered the whole of Cyrenaica, the eastern province of Libya.
2. Although
Tobruk itself, seventy miles west of the Egyptian frontier, is well to the east
of the centre of this area, it remained the fulcrum about which the pendulum
swung for clear reasons of geography. The first arose from the existence of the
Gebel Akhdar, the area between Benghazi and the Gulf of Bomba. Any army that
tried to hold its opponents here was liable to be cut of by an outflanking mov
across the desert from the south. The irony of it was that the area, known as
"The Bulge", was in fact one of the main objs of both sides. Its
significance to the British was that, unless the airfds which it contained
could be used, no aerial escort or protection could be given to ships trying to
make the journey between Malta and Alexandria. Secondly, if "The
Bulge" remained in Axis hands for long, as Crete, bounding the sea way to
the north, already was, not only might Malta itself be brought to its knees,
but even if that was not achieved, action by naval and air forces again the
Axis lines of comm by sea and air across the Mediterranean would eventually be
reduced to complete ineffectiveness.
3. From the time that the German, alarmed at
the prospect of the collapse of Italian hold on the North African coast,
intervened to help their allies at the very end of 1940, untill the Battle of
EI Alamein determined the course of the north African campaign for good and
all, the British government was concerned that con of this "Bulge"
should never be lost for long. This clashed with the desire of successive comds
- in - chief in Cairo that the task should not be attempted until they had
available a force sufficient, not only to capture "The Bulge" but to
retain it thereafter by securing the key to the western door at Metrsa Brega.
This conflict of presure provided the backdrop to the drama that was to be
enacted on the Cyrenaican stage.
Imp of Tobruk
4. Tobruk held a key possession in the
struggle for possession of "The Bulge". As the only sheltered harbour,
capable of taking any thing larger than a Caique, between Benghazi and
Alexandria, it had great log value. Not that by any stretch of imagination
could this village with its tiny quay be regarded as a port. Nevertheless quite
sizable ships could shelter there and could be unloaded by lighter, while
smaller ones could come alongside. Six hundred tons a day was about the limit
of its capacity, although for short periods this was exceeded.
5. Rommel needed Tobruk for two good
reasons. This grubby port was still the best harbour in Cyrenaica - in fact, in
all North Africa. And it blocked out a twenty two mile stretch of the coastal
highway, forcing his sup convoys mov fwd to the Egyptain frontier on to fifty
mile inland detour along a desert trial of indescribable condition. With Tobruk
in en hands even Rommel dared not resume his offensive toward Egypt and the
Nile valley, because the Tobruk gar could lance down across his sup lines at
any time.
Opposing Forces
a. Allied. Gen Wavell (C-in-C)
(1) Tobruk
Forces (Gen Morshad
(a) 9th australian Div (8 Inf Bns)
(b) 1xMed MG Bn
(c) 1xKing;s Dragoon Gd (Recce Regt)
(d) 4xbritish Arty Regts
(2) Outside
the Perimeter (Brig Goth Sp Gp
Wavell's Concept of Def
6. When in April 1941 Gen Rommel opened his
first campaign and drove his en back to the Egyptian frontier, Gen Archibald
Wavell wisely held fast to Tobruk and so deprived his en of the only good sea
port east of Benghazi. Though its, retention diminished Wavell's striking force
in Egypt by two division, it put a stop to a further easterly adv of his
adversary. It lengthened the en land comms and compelled him to invest Tobruk.
Wavell decided to hold Tobruk in order to prevent the thousands of tons of sup
accumulated there to falling into the en's hands, and also to deprive the en of
the use of the port. It was a bold and wise decision, and because he could no
longer attk, the next best thing was to strike at his en's mob by denying him a
fwd base.
Depl
7. Wavell was fully aware of the imp of
hanging into Tobruk and also of the need of maint an aggresive spirit in the
conduct of the def battle. Gen wavell's concept had been to use the gar force
to estb a strong hold at Tobruk and harass the en in the desert with mob force.
The def org by Waell was executed by Major Gen Morshad who was the overall comd
of the forces depl in Tobruk and many distinct mil features. There was hard
flat desert floor slopping down to the coast in a series of steps with the gr
deeply indented by ravines (deep narrow gorges). The tow and its thirty mile
long perimeter were manned by British tks, arty and inf of the 9th Australian
Div. The def formed a rough semi-circle eight to nine miles from the town and
harbour, giving a perimeter of about thirty miles. It consisted of a double
ring of concrete A tk and MG posts behind a barbed wire fence, all well
concealed and with excellent FOF. An A tk ditch, though not everywhere
complete, ran along the length of the front. Nearer the town, especially around
the junc of Bardia and Al Adem rds and for some dist towards the forts
Palistrino and Solario were other localities forming the inner def.
Conduct
8. The main part of the British army was a
little more than a hundred miles away from Tobruk. It was impossible for Wavell
to send any fighter sp to the gar or maint British ac there. A total of about
twenty five thousand men were fighting this battle under the flag of the
British Empire. They had been categorically divided into three distinct forces
def, offensive and res.
9. In the absence of any cover, most of the
en's attempt of breaching the def. Wherever breached the res of that particular
sec were launched to eliminate the en and restore the posn. On failure of these
res the centrally positioned area res were made eff to throw back the en. The offensive forces were emp on
carrying out ltd offensives against the en depl along the defs. The German
forces and eqpt not classically depl for def battle were most vuln to these ltd
offensives. In the absence of any fighter sp Morshad had to rely solely upon anti-aircraft
fire to hold off the German bombers that were coming everyday on their five
mins run from EI Adem airfd.
Logs
10. The army of Tobruk was solely main by the
British navy and the merchant fleet. An attempt was made in landing Hurricanes
at Tobruk airfd but these were shifted at once by the Germans and were shot
down within a few mins of landing. No flare could be lit to bring in the ac at
ni.
Relief of 9th Australian Div
11. As the siege of Tobruk prolonged, Gen
Wavell successfully replaced the tried and worn out tps with fresh ones. Whole
of the Ninth Australian Div was taken off Tobruk and replaced by two English
bdes and bde of fighting Poles. The cas in the change over were almost nil. The
Australians left their trucks and guns behind and the new tps were simply mov
into the perimeter and took up the struggle. Though this mnvr lacked the
excitement of the battle but still it had the imp of a victory.
Strs and Weaknesses of Wavell's
Concept
12. Strs
a. Flexibility in emp and depl of his
forces.
b. Max utilisation of existing and aval
resources.
c. Tobruk forced
Rommel to split his forces to secure his lines of comm and put a stop to his
further easterly adv.
d. Britain Naval
forces dominated the Mediterranean, and this advantage was exploited to its
maximum by Wavell
e. Induction of
fresh troops to the gar of Tobruk added life to its def.
f. The frequent
ltd attks from Tobruk were a constant pick to the already bleeding German army.
13. Weaknesses
a. Wavell was
initially successful in forcing Rommel for committing a sizeable force against
Tobruk, but later due to predictable British tac, Rommel was able to secure his
line of comm with just 3000 tps.
b. Maint of Tobruk
army was costly in shipping and was a constant drain on naval resources.
c. It diminished
Wavell's striking force in Egypt by two div.
Causes of
Rommel's Failure
14. The main causes
of Rommel's failure in capturing Tobruk were:-
a. Wrong Assessment Rommel was not expecting such a stiff
resistance at Tobruk, therefore, did not emp sufficient resources for its
capture initially. At first it did not dawn on Rommel that en intended to fight
here to death. Until far into April 1941 he eagerly believed that the British
were pulling out, and they had only escaped from Cyrenaica into this port to
stage a second Dunkirk style evac. Rommel wasted many lives and much ammo
before he realised his mistake.
b. Unnecessary Delavs. Rommel had raced southward past Tobruk and
reached Sollum, the fisrt town on Egyptian soil. But in the desert , as in the
sea, dist count for little. What matters most in the desert is the destruction
of the en's ironmongery - their tks and guns. Without them, in the desert, any
en cannot fight. Rommel not only failed in the total destruction of British
forces during his Cyrenaican offensive but also failed to reach Tobruk before
the withdrawing British forces. As Rommel,s ops officer Major Ehlers had
suggested in the corps diary that "if Rommel had not gone gallivanting
across the desert to Mechili on 5 April, it might have been possible to reach
Tobruk before the en. These forces were not only able to reinforce the gar but
were also able to org a planned resistance against German onslaught .
c Piecemeal Attks. Rommel violated the principle of conc of forces
and emp his forces piecemeal during the siege of Tobruk. As Gen Paulus (Deputy
Chief of Gen Staff) commented privately to Maj Gen Streich (Rommel’s Panzer
Comd) “Can you give me one instance in history where a pen of en lines that was
begun in the evening was ever successfully exploited on the fol morning ".
As Streich had pointed out, the evening mov on 13th April by Col Ponath's 8th
MG bn gave the en all the adv wng they needed to be on gd when the main push
began.
d. Unprepared Attks. Although Rommel would not admit his own
fault and cont to put down the defeat down to this subordinate comds and other
reasons, it was he himself who did not pay any head to the gr realities and
valuable suggestions offered by his comds. There was a crises of confidence and
they blamed him for burning good men rather than preparing the aslt properly.
e. Inadequate Info. Germans did not know anything about the defs
of Tobruk. Until late in April 1941 they never knew that Italians had built 128
inter connected strong pts all along the thirty mile long perimeter. Like the
ditch guarding each str pt, the gangways were all covered in with wood and thin
layer of sand to conceal them. They housed anti tk gun and machine gun posns
and were all finished off flush to gd lvl to make them invisible to attackers
until they were right on top f them. They were hy barbed wire entanglements
around them. Little wonder that Rommel's attempts to rush to Tobruk had been
repulsed so bloodily.
f. Incomplete Siege. History shows that those sieges are
usually repelled which are attempted on cities that can be reached with sup
from the sea. Londonderry in Northern Ireland and Candia in Crete are two
shining instance from former centuries. Because of ocean borne sp at Londoderry
the army of James II failed in 1689, while the Truks required twenty four years
(1645-1669) to subdue the capital of Crete. The same happened during the siege
f Tobruk also. Rommel due to his weaknesses at sea was not able to stop the
supplies of the gar and thus could not bring it down.
g. Lack of Trg. The attk on the western perimeter of
Tobruk at the end of April had revealed a lack of expertise in plain inf
fighting among German tps. As Rommel commented himself "The high
casualties suffered by my aslt forces were primarily caused by their lack of
trg. It frequently happened that dash was used where caution was really needed
and when boldness was required, the men were over cautious. The main problem
for the German tps, specially the panzer crews, was that it had suddenly become
an entirely different sort of war for them, for which they were not properly
trained.
h. Land Air Coop. Another problem with which Rommel had to
grapple was his lack of authority over the Laftwaffe in Africa. Although
Frohlich (Lauftwaffe comd) was amenable to suggestions, it was his choice
whether his aircraft acted in close tactical sp of Rommel;s troops or in more
wide ranging tasks of en harassment, and his choice did not always coincide
with Rommel’s.
j. Logs. Above all there was always the basic problem of supplies. As Gen Paulus
had rubbed it in, "the fact was that Rommel's brilliant but undisciplined
adv on Tobruk had failed to bring decisive victory but had added another 700
miles to his already extended lines of sup". For bare survival, the Afrika
Korps at that time needed 24,000 tons of supplies each month. To stockpile for
future offensie, it needed another 20,000 tons each month. But the German
representatives in Rome could not find any way of providing Rommel with more
than about 20,000 tons a month, even
less than bare survival. Thus due to his rapid adv to Tobruk and relatively
slower log build-up, Rommel was not able to assault the gar with his full str
initially. But later, once the required log built-up was completed, the British
forces had succeeded in organising an impregnable def of Tobruk.
Conclusion
15. The def of
Tobruk proved that even in a terrain as the desert, a skilful comd could hold
his en in defensive operations, but the offensive spirit in def is essential
for its success. Tactically the most interesting feature in this brief campaign
was the problem of petrol sup in mechanised operations, and the imp of keeping
that sup mobile and protected against air attks. Dumping though useful when
conditions are static, if relied upon in a war of rapid movements, subordinates
tactics to logs, and thereby deprives comds of liberty of action. Therefore,
any offensive without sufficient log backup is likely to fail even when
executed by some body as competent as Rommel.
BATTLE OF TOBRUK (1941)
1. Gen German forces were not provided adequate time
to recover. They had faced difficult days at Derna and then the journey through
the desert. Moreover, Australian reargds fought vigorous delaying actions with
them along the coastal rd. Rommel's desire to encircle the withdrawing en could
not be fulfilled. British forces managed to wdr intact and were in a posn to
give a tough fight in the Tobruk def. Tobruk perimeter was about 45 KMs.
2. British
Force. There were about
25,000 men, just half of them Australian inf, def the Tobruk gar. Tks and arty
wpns were as fol :-
a. Tks
(1) 25 Cruisers
(2) 4 Matildas
(3) 15 Mark IV
(4) Marmon-Harringtons
b. Arty
(1) 1 x 18 Pr Lt Regt
(2) 1 x 60 Pr Med Regt
(3) 4 x 25 Pr Regt
3. German
Forces.
a. Ariete Armd Div
b. 15th Panzer Div
c. 2nd MG Bn, 8MG Bn
d. 3rd Recce Unit
e.
5th Pz Regt
4. British
Plan. Gen Morshed with
seven of his thirteen inf bns to the first line, each with a res coy to back it
up. One coy had around one and a half kms of front line to hold. Due to absence
of A tk guns, tks were allowed to be by passed, and only attk the accompanying
inf. Any aval tk fmns and arty would engage the Panzers.
5. German
Plan. Rommel divided his weak
forces into three. He sent 2nd MG Bn, with some AA guns and arty, to the east
flank of Tobruk, to block the coast rd.The 3rd Recce unit, was to push further
eastward; for the idea was to push on to Suez after the fall of Tobruk.
6. Conduct The attk started on 11 Apr 41. German tps
could take only a few rushes towards north eastward once stalled by eff arty
shelling. The attk was again ordered the
next day but again without arty. Panzer attk at 1100 in the morning but could
not make a headway due to arty shelling and A tk ditch. The inf attk gained
hardly any gr. A fierce fight took place. The Pz fmn tried to mnvr but they
could not avert the British arty and A tk guns. The attk petered out and 8th MG
Bn lost about 700 men in a fortnight.
7. Reasons
for German Defeat.
a. Lack
of arty and armr sp to inf fmns.
b. German
tps were not given time to recover before prep to attk on Tobruk.
c. Wrong info of British evac the Tobruk
gar.
d. Strong def perimeter taken up by British
tps.
e. German tps could not achieve surprise in
the dir of attk.
f. Weak
German forces, not capable of launching an offensive. Moreover, these weak
forces were further distr into three, thereby conc of force could not be
achieved and attk could not progres at any pt.
g. Eff arty bombardment by British.
h.
Wrong est
of British str in Tobruk gar.
OP ‘BATTLE
AXE’ (BATTLE OF HALFYA PASS)
Backgr
1. War in Western Desert dev badly for
Allies after the arrival of German forces in Libya. Rommel opened his offensive
at El Agheila on 24 Mar 41. El Agheila fell at once and Mersa Brega, in its
immediate rear on 31 Mar. Mechili was abandoned by the Allies on 8 Apr and
Tobruk was surrounded by 11 Apr 41. Rommel launched a deliberate offensive on
the def on ni 30 Apr/1 May and managed to achieve some success, however,
Australians gave a stubborn resistance to def the gar and virtually destroyed
half of German tks. This forced Rommel to bypass the gar and mov towards Bardia
and Sollum. By mid May Germans had
reached Halfaya Pass and a pause was experienced due to lack of rft. This
provided an opportunity to British forces for planning a ctr offensive and
Wavell planned ‘Op Battleaxe’ to pen the Axis line near Bardia.
Obj
2. To gain decisive victory in North Africa,
destroying Rommel’s forces in the process and drive the en back west of Tobruk.
3. British
a. Bty of 25 Pr.
b. 2 x Matilda Regts.
c.
2 x Cruiser Regts ex 7th Armd Bde.
d.
22nd Gd Bde.
e.
4th Armd Bde.
4. German
a. Bty of eighty - eight
b. 5th Lt Div - 5 Pz Regt
c. 15 Pz Div - 8th Pz Regt
5.
British
Plan. 4th Armd Bde in
conjunc with Indian Inf was to attk Halfaya pass. In the west slow Matilda was
to sweep around the escarpment and aimed for Capuzzo. The faster Cruisers were
to mov on a wider arc, so as to cover the left flank of the Matilda force.
6. Conduct. The attk started at first lt on 15 Jun.
a. 15
Jun
(1) Right at the
start the Matildas were stuck in the minefds which were supposed to have been
cleared.
(2) A Bty of 25
Pr which was to soften up the German posn was stuck up in the loose gr.
(3) German had depl
eighty-eight guns at Halfaya pass which blazed away the Matildas and by 11
O’clock only one out of seventeen Matildas was left.
(4) In the west, the
Cruisers of 7th Armd Bde were faced by Hafid Ridge called ‘Pt 208’. Farther
east, the Matildas of 4th Armd Bde had to adv past ‘Pt 206’.
(5) There were
eighty-eitht dug in on Hafid Ridge which took on the Cruisers and flew them
apart.
(6) ‘Pt-206’ was def
by a few hy recce cars and 50 mm SP A tk guns. The Germans def themselves
fiercely and cost better part of sqn of Matildas.
(7) About eighty
Matildas of 4th Armd Bde broke massively into the Capuzzo area.
(8) German Air Force
(Stuka) also remained active and destroyed quite a no of British tks.
(9) 5th Lt Div, with
its Panzer Regt, came from south of Tobruk. It reached the gar of Hafid Ridge
just in time. 5th Panzer Regt came up against 7th Armd Bde and forced it away
to the south.
(10) A fierce
engagement dev in Capuzzo. Elms of 8th Panzerr Regt attk the place and put
eight Matildas out of action.
b. 16 Jun
(1) 15th Panzer Div
was set to throw the British, dug in the previous day, out of Capuzzo.
(2) A Fierce fight
took place and considerable losses were suffered by both sides
(3) The decisive
action took in south where 5th Panzer Regt was again attk by 7th Armd Bde.
(4) The
break through of the 5th Lt Div toward Sidi Omer and Sidi Suleiman brought about
the decisive turning pt of the battle as it threatened to block the way of main
British body to the south behind the escarpment
c. 17 Jun.
(1) The sit of the
British was very precarious. 7th Armd Bde’s cruiser str had shrunk to thirty.
Matilda, too, had suffered hy losses.
(2) Gen Messervy,
Comd of 22nd Gds Bde and Matilda Bde, had decided on his own initiative to evac Capuzzo to avoid
being encircled.
(3) German Panzer
were apch from the south to close the trap.
(4) British forces
managed to retreat and avoid the encirclement.
7. Result/Losses.. British had lost 99 tks, 64 of them
Matildas. German losses totaled only 12 Panzers. B fd remained in German hands
8. Reasons for British Defeat.
a. Wavell could
not throw his armr into action in a conc way for two reasons. He had to detach
a regt of Matildas to retake the pass, and his remaining mech forces could not
mov together due to two slow Matilda regts and two fast Cruisers.
b. Matildas, inf
tks, were sent into action in the Cruiser role where as they were conceived for
different purpose. The were liable to end up with mech breakdowns when used for
long forced marches.
c. Germans had
depl a bty of eighty-eight guns and siting was as such that these were not
visible even at fifty mtrs.
d. No air or arty
sp was provided to the tks against well prep inf posns.
e. A bty of 25 pr
had been aloc to soften up, the German posns, but there was no joint overall
Comd.
f. Lack of
accuracy of British arty.
g. Germans were
alerted in good time about the dir of attk due to liberal use of open wrls tfc
by the British.
h. Due to presure
from Churchill to launch offensive, Wavell could not allow his soldiers even a
few days to familiarise themselves with new Cruiser Models.
j. The German inf
in the def was well reinforced by A tk
guns and arty.
k. Less range of
British 2 pr gun as compared to German guns.
l. Rommel’s
clever handling of his armr.
m. Slow speed of British hy inf tks.
n. Too small and very short range A tk guns
used by the British.
o. No HE ammo with A tk guns mtd on inf tks.
OP-CRUSADER
(18 NOV 41 TO 12 JAN 42)
Introduction
1.
Italy jumped into 2nd world war as the
partner of Germany on 10 Jan 1940. She invaded Egypt to make herself the sole
master of the South Mediterranean Coast, as well as to hold the Suez Canal and
Red Sea. Initially they were successful, but in Feb 1941, things looked black
for the Axis in NA, fol defeat after defeat in the hands of small British tk
force but two months later all that had changed. Now the allied themselves lay
in confusion and Axis pushed them back to the frontiers of Egypt. How it
happened? Can Solely be attributed do FM Rommel’s dynamic Idrship.
2.
On 17th Jun 1941, Wavell suffered another
setback as a result of “Op Battle Axe”. Op crusader began on 18th of
Nov 1941, to a great extent redeam the allied prestige and put halt though temp
to Rommels unrelenting offensive. This compaign present a unique case for the
tactician and strat analysts. It is in context, I intend presenting the Allied
Ctr offensive on Cyrenaica Code named “Op Crusader” who’s aim is.
Aim
3. To analyse Op Crusader with spec emphasis on the fol:-
a.
Imp of through and purposeful prep.
b.
Detailed planning at all lvls.
c.
Boldness in exec to capitalise on fleeting
opportunities
5.
GM, I intend dealing with the op in the fol req:-
a. Part
– 1. Op environments.
b. Part
– II. Op Crusader.
c. Part
– III. Analysis.
d. Part
– IV. Lessons learnt/concl.
Op Environment
6. Theater
of Op. The theater of op
extends from the doors of Egypt to the border of Tripol. It was encompassed by the
Mediterranean Sea in the north. Which skirted all along the front. In the west
lay Tripolitania, in the east was Egypt and in the south was the vast endless
desert. From EI Agheila upto Sidi Omar the frontier extended to about 300 350
miles.
7. Concl
from Terrain and Weather. Funnel
shape of the hinterland was such that the deeper one penetrates the wider would
be the frontages, large forces would be req to fix any continuos line of
defence. Terrain was suitable for large scale armr op But increased Adm
problems to many folds such as extra wear and tear of men and material req 100%
material res. Inadequate comm infrastructure restd strat as well as tac mob to
trs. Terrain encompassing vast spaces and weather hazards, were likely to
exert, decisive influence on the out come of op particularly with ref to
duration of op and log sp. Vastness of the space could cause dilution of tps to
space ratio.
Part II Op Crusader
8.
Opposing
Forces
a.
Allied
Forces
(1) Eight
Army. (Gen Sir Alan
Cunnigham)
(a) 30
Corps. (Lt Gen C.W. M. Norrie)
i.
7th Armd Div.
ii.
4th Armd Bde Gp.
iii.
1st SA Div.
(b) 13th
Corps. (Lt Gen A. R. Austin)
i.
NZ Div.
ii.
4th Indian Div.
iii.
1st Army Tk Bde.
(c) Tobruk
Gar. (Maj Gen R.
M. Scobie)
i.
70th Div.
ii.
Polish Carpathian Inf Bde Gp.
(d) Misc
Forces. (Brig D. W. Scobie)
i.
29th Indian Inf Bde Gp.
ii.
6th South African Armd Car Regt.
(e) Army
Res. 2nd South African
Div.
b. Axis
Forces. North African Comd
– Gen Erwin Rommel.
(1) German
Africa Corps. (Lt Gen Ludwing
Cruwell)
(a)
15 Panzer Div.
(b)
21 Panzer Div.
(c)
Africa Div (Later 90th Light Div).
(d)
Savona Div (Italian).
(2) Italian
21 Corps. (Gen Enea Navarrimi)
(a)
Bologna Div.
(b)
Brescia Div.
(c)
Pavia Div.
(d)
Trento Div.
(3) Italian
Mobile 20th Corps. (Gen
Gastone Gambara)
(a)
Ariete Armd Div.
(b)
Trieste Motorized Div.
9.
Opposing
Aims
a. Allied. To destroy all axis forces in that part of the Cyrenaica,
which lay to the east of Tobruk.
b. Axis. To consolidate the present FDLs along the frontier of Egypt,
capture Tobruk and then further adv into Egypt.
10.
Conduct
a.
30th Corps crossed the frontier at dawn on
Nov 18 and adv to Gabr Saleh by the evening meeting nothing formidable on the
way except two recce units. Rommel at this stage was of the opinion that this
was a recce force and made no change in disposn.
b.
On reaching Gabr Saleh, Cunningham was still in the
dark as to the en intentions and hence still unwilling to send the whole of 30th
Corps to Sidi Rezegh for fear that the German Armr might fall on austin’s
f;aml. Accordingly the 4th Armd Bde Gp more than 1/3 of Norrie Armr
was held back till next day to watch the gap between 30th and 13th
Corps. Adv was resumed by 7th Armd Div. The 7th Bde
reached Sibi Rezegh 22 Armd Bde attk the Ariete div at E1 Gubi, while 4 Armd
Bde adv north. Rommel now fully convinced of maj offensive, concl that he could
safely turn his back on Gabr Saleh and the birtish in detail by sending both
German Armd Divs to destroy 7th Armd Bde at Sidi Rezegh. Cruewell
alongwith 15Panzer struck Sidi Rezegh and smashed the en over there Now both
Crurewell and Rommel were aware of XIII Corps and British 1st tk Bde
that were Halfaya and Sid Omar. So the plan was reformed as fol:-
“Afrika
Corps to drive wide through the desert into the en rear. Destroy the remnants
of XXX Corps. There after capture Halfaya and Sollum thus serving XIII Corps
from its Base”
c.
As per the new plan 15th Panzer was to
destroy the Indian Div in Sidi Omar. 21st Panzer was to take on
Halfaya. Italian XXI motorised was to deal with the remnants of XXX Corps.
d.
During the execution of this plan complete confusion
spread into the Africa Corps, since Rommel and Cruewell disappeared for
complete 25th Both were travelling in the same car which got stuck
up in the desert and they remained out of comm with their outfit. Now the
pendulum swing the other way.
e.
The XXI Italian motorised Corps as usual dragged its
feet behind the Africa Corps and ultimately was stopped by the 4th
Armr bde east of Sidi Omar.
f.
5th Panzer Regt ex 21 Panzer Div instead of
accompanying 21st Panzer to Halfaya attk Sidi Omar which was the tgt
of 15th panzer.
g.
15th Panzer instead of Sidi Omar went for
Sidi Azeiz while 21st Panzer of 5th Regt went for Halfaya
and bumped into the Newzealanders suffered badly.
h.
5th Panzer Regt was completely beaten back
by Indian Bde at Sidi Omar. On the other hand the remanent of XX Corps
j. On the 5th
of Dec Africa Corps was ordered to withdrawn to Gazala line, 90 x Div withdrew to Agedabia.
k. On 15th
Dec the British with their entire str struck at Gazala wheeling sharply round
the south flank of Africa Corps . Before it could trap the Afrika Corps, Rommel
issued the final orders for the Corps to withdraw to Agedabia. This was a
classical example of a retrograde battle fought by Rommel in which he first
withdrew to Gazala and then to Agedabia.
l.
Thus came the op Crusader to an end resulting in the
exhaustion of both Allies and Axis.
11. Imp
of Thorough and Purposeful Prep. It
is imperative for any army of the world to train vigorously, built themselves
up in men, natural and should strain every nerve to pull in as much sup and
reinforcement as possible Allied forces in operation “Crusader” were better
placed in this regard. For almost completely, five month they prep them
thoroughly in the fol fields.
a. Estb of Various Commands. On assuming Comd Gen Auchinleck divided his
comd into two main operational theatres, giving each theatre, a separate army
with its own HW and an indep base and area. Western desert was marked out as
the op theatre of .
b. Administrative Re-Org. The western desert Railway
was extended by 75 miles from its railhead at Matruh (railhead at Bir
Bisheifa). Water pipe line was extended beyond Matruh. Wells were bored and
hundreds of distribution pipes were laid. The road mileage was increased .
Aerodromes and landing grounds were constructed. Many hospitals were estb and
more camps were laid out. The sup system was overhauled to bring up the western
theatre to gen state of readiness for Op Crusader.
c. Trg and Eqpt. Combined trg centres was estb at Kabrit to
lay spec emphasis on desert movements of mech columns. Cadet trg unit was org and
expanded for importing specialist trg and system of giving eight weeks trg was
introduced, The re-eqpt of units was carried out on a fairly elaborate scale.
Vehs of all types arrived from Great British, Canada, Australia to South
Africa, incl tks and trucks from united States. Thus between 1 July and 31 Oct,
the western sector had received about 34,000 trucks, 2100 armd vehs, 600 field
guns, 240 anti-aircraft guns, 900 morters, 80,0000 rifles and vast qty of ammo
and other eqpt.
d. Reinforcement. 8th army responsible for OP
Crusader was further str by adding the reinforcement of 3 armd bde.
e. Relief of Tobruk Tps. The relieving up of the Torbruk tps were even
accomplished before the commencement of Op Crusader i.e by 26 Oct 1941.
12. Axix
Army. Axis army was gen
not prep for the op, since no improvement was made in org, eqpt, trg and log
duri8ng the lull period of 5 months i.e after the termination of Battle Axe,
till the start of op-crusader. Resultantly, the prep fruit was tasted by the
allied army.
13. Detailed
Planning at All Lvls. Detail
planning basically plays a fundamental role for successful execution. The
allied forces were little better in ratio in the imp sectors. The planning for
launching op crusader started immediately, once the Gen Auchinleck assumed the
comd of western threater and it was due to the detail planning that afforded
prep, and met the req of the plan. However, no contingency was planned, one
classic example was of the 30 Corps, which when took off for Sidi Rezegh was
seriously crushed by the Axis had no clue, what to do next. Axis army eas even
worst., initially they were yet to plan an offensive, secondly when they
planned to defeat the 8th Army comprehensively and once for all by
driving wedge through the desert into the en rear, committed two vital
mistakes:-
a.
Serving 15th and 21st panzer
divs from the base had no improved comm infra-structure
b.
The details of the plan were never made understood at
all .lvls. Therefore once Rommel and Cruewell disappeared from the scene for 12
hrs everything went wrong.
14. Boldness
in Exec to Capitalise on Fleeting Opportunities. Victory in war is only blessed to a Comd/Army, who takes advantage
of the rough and odd hrs and lastly do have faith in himself as well as his
under comd. The Axis army very much lacked in this factor also. Rommel got the fleeting opportunity, when he
initially crushed the 30th Corps moving for Sidi Rezegh, but moved
to the frontier without destroying it completely 30th Corps at a later stage managed to re-org
itself and created havoc for cutting the Axis mov westward. On the other hand,
allied comd displayed boldness and capitalise the opportunities as their on the
view fol:-
a.
Dispatching the Newzelender div towards Tobruk.
b.
Auchinleck decision of 24th Nov, to
continue the offensive and refused to put off by Rommel’s dash towards
frontier.
c.
Replacing Maj Gen Nail Ritchie with Chunningham as 8th
Army comd on 26 Nov.
d.
Lastly the decision to bring in fresh tps against the
diminishing resources of the Germans.
If one more
opportunity, which was offered by Rommel, while withdrawing from Gazala, had
been capilasted by the Allied, it would have decided the fate of Axis Army once
for all.
Part IV – Lessons Learnt.
15. Unity
in Conception. Overall
strategy must be single in conception from beginning to the end with variants
to cater for all possible eventualities. Plan must be know all comds in .
16. Asticulation
of Comd. An op can succeed only,
if efficiently led and controlled.
17. Leadership. Only competent and genuine
leadership can motivate and inspire the tps. The resultant high morale can be a
battle winning factor.
18. Assessment
of Enemy. Enemy’s factor must be
thoroughly examined and operation based on his capabilities rather than
intentions. Assumptions must be realistic to avoid being surprised.
19. Aims
and Objectives. These should be
realistic, clearly and compatible with the resources aval. . Political and
military objs must be dev in mutual harmony.
20. Inter
Services Coord. A well organised
elaborate and efficient system of coord between three svcs for joint planning
and conduct of ops in most vital for success in war.
21. Prep
for Offensive Ops. It
is needless to say that deliberate and realistic prep include adm., trg and
re-org, re-eqpt can contribute substantially towards the success/victory
Concl
“Crusader” can be summed up
as a hardly fought and costly victory won more by the bravery and tenacity of
the British soldiers than by the tact8ical skill of their comds. At the same
time it should be remembered that it was only Auchinleck's strong nerve and
ability to read a battle that made the victory possible.
OP CRUSADE
(Ph - 1 & 2)
1. Backgr. After the nasty experience of ‘Battleaxe’,
a strict radio silence had been ordered as the greatest armada had been so for
rolled into posn. German aerial recce noticed nothing. ‘Op Crusader’ brought on
by far the biggest battles upto the time in the North Africa.
2. Force. The British Force comprised of
equivalent of seven divs, incl the Tobruk gar. It was opposed by three German
and seven Indian divs. The British had five bdes of armr, while Rommel had the
equivalent of two German & one Italian. British tks totalled over 7oo with
some 200 in res. Rommel’s str at the start was 500 (incl 150 Italian). In ac,
British had 700 against 120 German and about 200 Italian.
3. Orbat
a. British (8th Army)
(1) 7th
Armd Div (Gen Gott)
(a) 4th Armd Bde
(b) 7th
Armd Bde (Brig Campbell)
i. 2nd Royal tk Regt
ii. 7th Hussars
iii. 8th Hussars
(c) 22nd Armd Bde
(2) 6th Royal Tk Regt
(3) 4th Ind Inf Div
(4) NZ Div
(5) 1 SA Div
(6) 10th British Div (Tobruk gar)
b. German. Africa Corps
(1) 15th Pz Div
(2) 21st Pz Div
(3) 90th Lt Div
(4) Ariete Div (Armr)
(5) 361st Africa Regt
4. Obj
of 8th Army. During the planning
stage three objs in the fol sequence were derived :-
a. Destroy en armr
b.
Relief of Tobruk.
c.
Re-occupation of Cyreniaca.
d. Take Tripolitonia
5. Plan. 13 Corps to pin down German and Italian tps
holding frontier posns while 30 Corps would sweep rd the flank to seek out and
destroy Rommel’s armd force. They were then to link up with the Tobruk gar,
some seventy miles west of the frontier, which was to
break out
and meet the 30 Corps.
6. Conduct
a. The op started on 18 Nov 41. The max of Cruisers made a
rapid thrust for Sidi Rezegh, just 15 kms sout of Tobruk on the escarpment.
b. The
7th Armd Bde dir for Sidi Rezegh and 22nd Armd Bde made a wider arc, ran into
the Italian Ariete Div far to the south and was held up there. Italians lost 40
tks but put 25 Cruisers out of action. 4th Armd Bde on, the rt flank of 7th
Armd Bde, came up against the 21st Pz Div. The 4th Armd Bde, too, was held up
and decimated. At the border fence, the NZ and Indian Divs adv slowly with the
Matilda regts.
c. Despite
these clashes, no great collision of great masses of tks took place in first
three days.
d. The
breakout of Tobruk was to take place on the morning of 21 Nov. It was
planned due to the smooth adv of 7th Armd Bde to Sidi Rezegh area.
e. In
the meanwhile Rommel disengaged his armr from the south. 4th and 22nd Armd Bde
were grappling with a strong front of A tk guns, arty and eighty-eight. Pz
Force was now aval to pick off smaller tk fmns. 7th Hussar was the fist victim
which was to stay in res and provide flank cover. 2nd Royal Tk Regt was also
rubbed out by the Pz.
f. Bde
Comd, Brig Campbell, managed to collect the remnants of 7th Armd Bde and formed
a sp gp.
g. The
premature drive north ward in the dir of Tobruk did not produce any result
either except hy losses.
h. All
this time, from almost complete annihilation of the 7th Armd bde at Sidi
Rezegh; through the costly adv of their reinforced sp gp; through Brig
Cambell’s spectacular rescue op; to the bloody breakout attempt from Tobruk –
took place on 21 Nov.
j. Now
sit changed distinctly in Rommel’s favour. 7th Armd Bde was smashed, 4th and
22nd Armd Bdes stood battered but still in good order and str, while the South
African inf adv north ward between them toward Sidi Rezegh. The rt arm of adv -
NZ and Ind inf with an army tk bde of
Matildas - was travelling around the back of the escarpment, which runs
south-west from Sollum - Halfya, and had already cut the tps sta there, incl
the 8,000 men Bardia gar. The Tobruk gar made a 5km bulge in the siege ring
without breaching it.
k. The
British forces were still separated; Rommel had kept his two German Pz divs
together, while the Italian div was holding up Bir-el-Gobi to the south.
l. The German side reacted remarkably sluggishly.
Its divs even parted; the 15th Pz Div made a 20km trip on the ni of 22 Nov to
reach the area south of Gambut, while the 21st Pz Div skirted the Sidi Rezegh
area to the north. The sup colms bringing fuel and ammo had trouble finding
them. (Meanwhile water had run so short that washing had been officially
forbidden).
m. On
22 Nov, 21 Pz Div sp by 90th Lt and some arty C attk Sidi Rezegh air fd. 22nd
Bde & remnants of 7th Armd Bde was to face this force. The airfd was
captured by the German and British were forced to the south.
n. On
23 Nov, out of three bdes that had set out as the lt arm of the adv with over
480 tks, the fol were aval on 23 Nov; 10 Cruisers of the 7th Armd Bde, 40
Cruisers of the 22nd Armd Bde, 100 Honeys of the 4th Armd Bde, of which only
few were svcable.
o. Rommel’s
two Pz regts were no longer up to their nominal str of 120 tks. There were not
more than 75 tks each.
p. 23 Nov became something a disaster for
the British. Rommel gathered his mech forces - always accompained by A tk guns,
arty, and engrs - for a strike at the remaining units South of Siddi Rezegh.
The German-Italian armd forces now enjoyed substantial superiority. A bitter
battle raged and a battle progresively shrouded in dust and the dark smk of
burning vehs.
q. Rommel
had won the day again
7. Reason for British Failure
a. The armr
of 13 Corps and 30 Corps were widely separated due to wide out flanking mov.
b. Lack of
coord amongst both the Corps especially their armr.
c. Force was
divided to cater for all sorts of flank protection.
d. The excellent
work of German mob maint team to refit the tks for action after the battle.
e.
The fortified Halfaya and Sollum passes in particular
well left behind on the rt, their capture would have eased up the sup line.
OP CRUSADE
PHASE - 3
Backgr
1. The 24 Nov was
the day when Rommel seized the reins again. He
threw Westphal’s wngs to the wind, took his Chief of Staff
Gause and the C-in-C of the Africa Korps, Cruewell, in hand and led his entire
mechanized and motorized force on one of the most frequently discussed ops of
the Sec World War.
2. What is
indisputable is that the thing went thoroughly wrong, that Cruewell had until
then led the Afrika Korps most successfully, and that 24 Nov was the turning pt
of the battle.
3. As even
Westphal, for all his well-bred reticence, admits, Rommel was in a highly
euphoric mood after the Remembrance Day victory. He was convinced that he could
concl the entire campaign victoriously on the spot with a surprise
raid-shifting the center of gravity at lightning speed.
Aim
4. He had three
aims in view for this far-ranging hook through the desert to the south, and
subsequent wheeling mnvr to the north and east. He wanted to cut the British
sup lines and at the same time, exploiting their frequently displayed fear of
being outflanked, to force them to retreat; to strike in the rear and
annihilate the New Zealanders, who were thrusting dangerously to the north and
west along the Via Balbia with their Matilda bde; and to break into Egypt over
the passes and drive east, making for an obj that was never explicitly named
but was certainly a very distant one.
Conduct
5. At this pt, Rommel’s main force,
consisting of the two Pz Regts, was already badly battered. From the time they
had set out southward, they had been in action continuously, steadily fired at
by tks and arty and, in addn, chased by RAF bombers. During the attempt to take
Sidi Omar, they had run into a front of 25-pr and hy Matildas. Sidi Omar stayed
in British hands. In the evening on 25 Nov, the 5th Panzer Regt had just twelve
tks left and the 8th had fifty-three. And this time, most of the wrecks could
be neither salvaged nor repaired.
6. Brig Jock
Campbell was putting together some cbt gps there, consisting of mot inf, A tk
guns and 25-pr, which as indep colms “Jock Colm”, roamed the desert rt up to
the Via Balbia in the far northwest and could wipe out everything but strong
Panzer units.
7. On 26 Nov, the
“Tobruk Rats” at last broke through to EI Duda and occupied the ht there. In
the dist they saw some tks from which three red flares went up-the prearranged
sig of the Eighth Army. The comd of the British XIII Corps, Gen Godwin-Austin,
radioed Cairo: “Corridor to Tobruk free and secured. Tobruk not half as rel as
I am.”
8. But the thing
was by no means as safely in the bag as Godwin-Austin had hoped. On this 26
November, Westphal, who had still not had an even halfway comprehensible report
from Rommel about the sit and his intentions, at last ran out of patience. He
sig the Afrika Korps to return to Toburk immediately, “disregarding all orders
to the contrary.” The great adventure was over. It had decisively weakened
Rommel’s mob forces and at the same time given his adversary and opportunity to
reorg and bring in rfts.
9. On the ni of
8th Dec the pt was reached when the exhausted tps had to give up the siege of
Toburk. The 90th Lt Div and some unmot Italian units had been sent along the
coast toward Gazala. The mass of the Afrika Korps streamed through a new gap,
only two kms wide, near EI Duda, during the ni
Reason for Rommel’s Defeat/Retreat
10. A
careful analysis brings out the fol reasons for german defeat:-
a. Rommel force
did not occupy sup dumps which were loc in Gabr Saleh. They just dashed fwd and
ignored the areas around.
b. Rommel did not
try to destroy the remnants of 7th Armd Bde which was badly battered in Sidi
Rezegh
c. Rommel’s
main force consisting of two Pz Regts was badly battered. In the evening of 25
Nov, the 5th Pz Regt had just twelve tks and the 8th Pz Regt and thirty five
tks.
d. Lack of air
recce.
e. Shortage of
fuel.
f. Non-arrival
of Italian Ariete Div.
g. British had a
superiority of 5 to 1 in tks and 7 to 1 in gun armd tks.
h. Misinterpretation
of orders due to poor comm.
j. Cunningham had proposed 23 Nov for
retreat but Auchinleck ordered to cont the offensive. It was a gamble more
daring than Rommel’s wild lunge.
BATTLE OF
GAZALA
1. Forces
a. German. 3 x German Divs, 2 x Italian Mob Corps, 4 x (Unmot) Itlian Divs.
b. British
(1) XIII Corps
(a) 1 SA Div
(b) 50 Div
(2) XXX Corps
(3) Frech Bde
(4) 7 Armd Div & 1 Armd Div
2. British
Def. Gazala line was held by XIII Corps in the
north with 1 SA Div on the rt and 50 Div on the left. XXX Corps was to cover
the Southern flank and was to ctr any Panzer threat to the centre. Bir Hacheim
was held by a French Bde sp by the Armd Bde of 7 Armd Div. 10 Miles north, 1st
Armd Div was sta near Trigh Capuzzo.
3. Conduct. HQ 7 Armd Div was overrun and its Comd was
captured who later escaped. Rommel initially failed to cut through to the sea
and severing the LOC of Gazala line. At
one stage Rommel’s posn came very precarious but due to British failure to
exploit the sit, the bal had changed in Rommel’s favour. On 14 Jun, Ritchie
abandoned the Gazala line and by 15 Jun the Battle of Gazala was over.
4. Reasons
of British Defeat.
a. The
mov of German Armr around Bir Hacheim
was taken as a feint and main was expected in the centre.
b. On realizing the actual dir, British Armd Bdes were slow to
mov, and therefore their action was a piecemeal and was disrupted.
b.
8th Army Comd, Gen Ritchie, threw his armr piecemeal
and failed to conc them.
c.
The British were again dangerously dispersed.
d.
Rommel became a legendary fig that it seriously
affected their (British) capacity to fight.
e.
The new theatre of war in the Far East was swallowing
British men material.
f. Allies
sup sys was not functioning.
BATTLE OF TOBRUK(1942)
Back gr
1. Tobruk had been
one of the strongest fortres in North Africa in 1940. Although by 1942 the def
on landward side had been allowed to run down, it was still a hard nut to
crack. In 1941 it has presented Rommel with immense difficulties. Often the
battle had raged one sq yd at a time.
1a. The retreat of
Axis force to El Agheila during Dec 41 resulted into the over extension of
British forces. A maj sup convoy for Axis force arrived on 5 Jan 42. The 8th
Army at this time, in contrast, was under sup and off bal. Sensing its weakness
Rommel went for ctr offensive on 21 Jan.
1b. The victory in
Gazala battle on 15 Jun 42 battle enhanced the morale of German tps and they
dashed towards Tobruk which could not be cleared by the Axis forces during 1941
campaign. This time Axis tps were more optimistic due to the comprehensive
defeat of Allied in Gazala.
Geography
2. Tobruk was hemmed in on its eastern and
western sides by rocky and trless country which extended out to the south in a
flat and sandy plain. It had been extremely well fortified by the Italians
under Balbo, and a full had been taken of the most modern wpns for the
reduction of fortification. The numerous def posns running in a belt rd the
fortres were sunk in the gr in such a manner that they could only be loc from
the air.
3. British
Forces-(About 2500 tps)
a. Inside Tobruk
(1) 2 x Inf Bde of SA Div
(2) 2 x Bns of 20 Ist Gds Bde
(3) 11th Ind Bde
(4) 2 x Bns of 32nd Tk Bde (Inf Tks)
(5) 4th AA Bde
f.
Outside Tobruk
(1) 5 x Inf Divs
(2) 2 x Armd Divs (Very Week)
Def Pattern/Layout of British Posn
4. Each def posn had consisted of an under
gr tunnel system ldg into machine and A tk Guns nests. These nets could wait
until the moment of greatest danger before throwing off their cam and pouring a
murderous fire into attk tps. Each separate posn was surrounded by an A tk
ditch and deep wire entanglements. In addn each fortified zone was surrounded
at all pts vuln to tks by a deep A tk ditch. Behind the outer line or belt of fortification,
often in depth, stood powerful arty conc, fd posns and a no of forts. These
impresive def works were protected by deep minefds.
Conduct
5. The attk started at 0520 hrs on 20 Jun
42. Several hundred ac hammered down their bombs on the break in pt south east
of the fortres. As the ac left off, the inf of Afrika Korp (15th Rifle Bde) and
XX Italian Corps mov fwd to the aslt. The lanes had been cleared the ni before.
The ditch was bridged. Ariete and Trieste divs fol the Africa Korp through pen.
By midday the Germans had reached the cross rd (Sidi Mahmud). Some resistance
was experienced from Fort Pilastrino and Jebel descent but it was overcome . By
ni fall two-third of the fortres lay in German hands.
Reason for Early Victory/Lost of
Tobruk
6. Fol factors attributed to an early
victory to the Germans:-
a. The bulk of tps
had already given up the battle and were tired and dispirited.
b. The British Comd was not very quick to
reorg def.
c. Germans gave no time to the British to
build up its def machine
d. No single seat
fighter was aval to drive off the bombers and dive - bombers.
e. Inferior tks
and wpns of British to German .
f. Poor Genship on
part of British.
FIRST BATTLE OF ALAMEIN
1. Force
a. British. 70 x Inf Bns, 900 tks & armd vehs, 550 lt & hy guns,
850 A tk guns.
b. German. Four German & eight Italian divs (two each being armd)
2. Reason
for German Defeat
a. Shortage of POL
restricting the long mnvrs.
b. Sickness to tps
caused by bad rations.
c. Shortage of sup
ie wpns and ammo.
d. Dummy pipeline
and dumps were made to conceal/protect the actual dumps from en air.
e. During the last
few days the fighter cover was intensified in the north to discourage any fresh
recce in detail.
f. Tp posn for the
day of attk were dug a month prior to the attk and dummy mov of vehs was shown.
During the final stages, these dummy no of vehs were sent to trg areas, so
apparently no change was vis.
g. Hy conc of arty
to sp the attk by Montgomery.
h.
Strong determination by Montgomery to exec his
offensive despite hy cas.
SECOND BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN
1. Rommel had
laid about 500,000 minefds around El Alamein posn. However, these were A tk,
therefore inf could walk over without danger. Italian posn were regp with
German to compensate for their poor eqpt.
2. Forces.
a. Combatant ratio 2:1 in favour of
Montgomery.
b. British had 1,100 tks and Rommel 500 to
550.
c. Montgomery had
1,000 med guns, 800 Six pr A tk guns and 500 two pr A tk guns.
d. Orbat
(British)
(1) XXX
Corps. (Gen Oliver Leese))
(a) 9th Aus Div
(b) 51st Highland Div
(c) 2 NZ Div
(d) 1st SA Div
(2) X
Corps (Gen Lumsden)
(a)
1st Armd Div
(b) 10th Armd Div
(3)
4th Ind Div & 7th Armd Div
e.
Orbat
(Germany)
(1)
Panzer Army
(a)
15th Pz Div
(b)
21st PzDiv
(c)
90 Lt Div
(d)
164 Lt Div
(2)
10 Itlian
Corps
(a)
Brescia Div
(b)
Pavia Div
(c)
Folgore Div
(3)
20 Italian
Corps
(a)
Ariete Armd Div
(b)
Littorio “
(c)
Trieste “
(4)
21 Itlian
Corps
(a)
Trento Div
(b)
Bologna Div
3. Plan. Montgomery intended to use his inf to exploit
two good passages through the minefds sp by a very powerful barrage from the gr
and air. The main attk was to be del by XXX Corps. Further south near the cen
of the line the 4th Ind Div would be used to create a local diversion. In the
far south near the Qattara Depresion the 7th Armd Div would make a diversionary
attk with the obj of distracting attention and pinning down en res, especially
21 Pz Div. When the two corridors in the north were properly secured, X Corps
would sweep through and estb themselves near Tel el Aqqaqir for the expected c
attk of the Pz Army
4. Conduct
a. The attk was
launched on 23 Oct 42. By 0100 hrs 24 Oct a pen was achieved in main def to a
depth of six miles. By 1800 hrs 24 Oct one bde of 1st Armd Div through the
corridor was right in the open.
b. By the morning
of 25 Oct, four bdes of X Corps were through and covering the mouth of six
miles breach.
c. Gen Stumme died
of a heart attk on 24 Oct and Rommel arrived back in Africa at dusk on 25 Oct.
d. By 0800 hrs on
the 26 Oct all the armr was out in the open. The fol three whole days of static
fighting.
e. Germans had
been pulled north to ctr the main British attk, the Italian being left bunched
to the south.
f. Montgomery aprc
this and changed his plan. He decided to attk to the pt of junc overlapping
well down to Itlian front. The decision was taken at 1100 hrs on 29 Oct.
g. ‘Thompson Post’
as the thumb-shaped salient in north was secured by 9th Aus Div on 29 Oct.
Germans tried to hammer the thumb all through 30 & 31 Oct. The whole
Germans res, which incl the 21 Pz & 90 Lt Div, were sucked into northern
trap.
h. Break through
in the south, ‘Op supercharge’ was ordered to take place on ni 31 Oct/1 Nov. It
took place on early hrs of 2 Nov.
j. The
Highlanders and Newzealanders attk at ni, gaps were driven into the line
further south.
k. Rommel was
caught off bal, and before be could regp, the 1st and 10th Armd Divs were in
and amongst the Pz Army.
l. A tremendously
fierce tk battle took place in the open at El Aqqaqir. By ni fall on 2 Nov
Rommel started to didengage.
m. The pursuit
proper began on 5 Nov and in twelve days adv enms of 8th Army - 7th Armd Div
had reached Msus, a dist of 560 miles. They had passed Sollum (270 miles) on
11th and next day were at Tobruk (360 miles).
m.
Rommel managed to avert the encirclement by British
forces. However, he had to retreat back to the pt from where he had started.
SECOND
BATTLE OF EL-ALAMEIN
Gen
1. After the battle of Alam Halfa, both armies settled down to a six week,
battle of supplies. Rommel knew that an enormous convoy carrying 100,000 tons
of sups was due to reach the British in Sep. But after Alam Halfa he did not
have the str to do much about it.
2. In his new comd, Gen Montgomery lived up
to his reputation as a careful planner who emphasised both trg and morale. 8th
Army had suffered many changes of fortune and comd in the North African
Theatre, and morale had lowered down to a serious deg. Failures of coop and
confidence had resulted in faulty ops, and Montgomery addressed himself to
rebuilding it. At the same time, he was amassing a force superior to the
German’s in very respect: tps, tks, guns and ac.
3. The Germans were well dug in along a line
between the Sea and the Qattara Depression. Rommel had chosen a static def,
consisting of a line of fixed posns fortified by enormous minefds stretching
from the coast to the Qattara depression. He was forced to chose this
uncharacteristic plan for fol reasons:-
a. He
had lost so many men from his mech divs, he had to adopt a tac in which non
motorised Div had to play predominant role.
b. British air
supermacy thoroughly inhibited his use of mobile forces, so that he was better
off in static, well dug in posns.
c. He was so short
of petrol that he could not afford the risk not having to break off in the
middle of mobile def, because he had run out of fuel.
4. Montgomery’s plan was to attk north of
the Miteirya Ridge. The infantry of XXX Corps was to push forward to the Oxalic
Line and open corridors through the minefds for passage of the X Corps Sherman
tks, which were finally proving a match for the German Mark IV. Axis forward
defs were manned largely by Italian tps, and Rommel was hospitalised in
Germany; he did not arrive until 25 Oct, when the battle was underway. Gen
Stumme comd in his absence.
Opposing Forces
6. British
- 8th Army (Montgomery)
a. X Corps (Lumsden)
(1) 1 Armd Div
(2) 10 Armd Div (incl 2 Armd Bdes)
b. XIII Corps (Horrocks)
(1) 44 Div
(2) 7 Armd Div
(3) 1 Free French
Bde
c. XXX Corps (Leese)
(1) 9 Australian Div
(2) 51 Div
(3) 1 South African
Div
(4) 2 NZ Div (with
an Armd Bde under comd) 2 NZ Div was relieved in line by 44 Div, whose posn at
Alam Halfa were taken over by 51 Div, recently from the UK.
4. German African Corps ( Rommel)
a. In Def
(1) 164 Div (Panzer
Grenadiers ) 1xGerman Div
(2) Trento
Div (Italian)
(3) Bologna Div
(Italian)
(4) Brescia Div
(Italian) 5xItalian Div
(5) Folgore Div
(Italian)
(6) Paria Div
(Italian)
(7) Ramke Para Bde - 1xPara
Bde (German)
b. Res
(1) North
(a) 15 Panzer Div
(German)
(b) Littorio Div
(Italian)
(c) 90 Lt Div
(German on the coast)
(2) South
(a) 21 Panzer Div (German)
(b) Ariete Div (Italian)
Opposing
Plans
5. The British Plan
a. The Basis of The Plan
(1) In planning
there were three main difficulties :-
(a) The problem of
blowing a hole in the German posn.
(b) The despatch of
a Corps strong in armr through the hole into en territory.
(c) The dev of op so
as to destroy the Axis forces.
(2) The concept of
plan was based upon to destroy first the un-armd fmns, and hold off the armd
Div and tackle with them subsequently.
b. The Actual Plan Montgomery issued orders on 6 Oct 1942. The
plan for the battle was :-
(1) The main thrust
by XXX Corps in the North was to be made on a front of four divs with a task of
forcing corridor through German minefds. X Corps was to pass through this
corridor and drive Rommael’s Pnzer Armee Africa back along the coast.
(2) In the South
XIII Corps was to mount two ops, one into the area east of Gebel Kalakh and
Qaret el Khadim, the other farther south dir on Himeimat and the Taqa feature.
(3) XIII and XXX
Corps having broken into the German defs were to undertake the methodical
destruction of the tps holding the fwd posns.
(4) The role of XIII
Corps was primarily to mislead the Germans into believing that British main
thrust was being delivered in the south, and keep German forces preoccupied
particularly to 21 Panzer Div.
(5) 7 Armd Div was
to be kept intact in southern sec in order to preserve balance.
(6) It was vital to
retain the initiative and keep up sustained pressure on the Germans.
(7) RAF was to win
the air battle before the attk opened, having obtained the ascendancy over the
German Air Force.. The whole of the air effort was to be aval to coop
intimately in the land battle.
c. The Cover Plan
(1) The cover plan
was worked out aimed at misleading Germans about the dir of the main thrusts
and the date of over readiness for the attk.
(2) The deception on
measures incl :-
(a) Preservation of the constant density of
vehs throughout the zones of ops so that Germans are denied the inferences made
from the changes disclosed in day to day air photograph.
(b) Dumps were
concealed by elaborate cam and by stacking stores to resemble vehs.
(c) A month before
the attk, slit trenches were dug, in which (when the time came) the assaulting
inf could be concealed.
(d) Active deception
measures incl work on a dummy pipe line, to indicate completion in Nov. Dummy
dumps were also made working to a similar date. Radio msgs were used to
indicate that armd forces were moving to the southern flank.
6. German
Plan. Rommel had placed all his inf divs behind a
screen of 500,000 mines and kept his two Panzer Divs (15 and 21) to the rear,
separated from each other by about 25
miles.
Conduct
6. The attk opened on the night of 23 Oct
with a hurricane of arty bombardment, behind which four inf div moved to the
assault. Hy fighting broke out as the German committed 15th PZ Div to hold the
break-in. There was bitter positional fighting on 24-25 Oct. Montgomery in
order to accelerate progress, put his main effort onto fighting for the coast
and for Kidney Hill during 26-29 Oct. Rommel continually counter attk with 21st
PZ Div and reinforce Coastal sector with 90 Lt Inf Div. In the south the German
resisted strongly and Montgamery decided to transfer forces from that sector to
the developing dogfight on the coast. The battle which ensued concentrated upon
the key features of the coastal corridor along which most lines of
communication ran and the commanding Kidney Hill position midway between the
coast and the Qattara Depression. Despite Rommel’s resourceful use of his PZ
div, Kidney Hill was gained and from there Montgmery launched his decisive
stroke known as op supper charge. Fol a hy arty barrage, a bitter tank battle
ensued, reducing the German armr by the evening of 2 Nov to 35 serviceable tks.
Now Rommel decided to withdraw but Hitler countermanded the orders and Allied
tps broke the German lines and armr unit poured through Next day Rommel was
forrced to order a full retreat and the remansts of his army set off westwards
along the coast roadtowards Tobruk.
Reasons of British Success
1. Sups. In Sep Rommel demanded 3,00,000 tons and
another 3,50,000 topns for Oct as the min supplies needed if his African Corps
was to stand any chance of neutralising the forthcoming British attk. Less than
half had arrived when the battle was again joined in late Oct. His appeals fell
on German ears deffed by the mighty battle of Stalingrad which even at that
moment hung in balance.
2. Air. When Rommel went on sick leave, he first went
to Rome to see Mussolini, and then to Hitler’s HQ in Eastern Prussia. In both
places he stressed the imp of air power in the desert and claimed that British
air supermecy was one of the main causes of his setbacks. He also warned his
leaders that without the sups African Corps would not be able to with stand British
on slaught. The tremendous power of the air in close coop with the land battle
was well demonstrated in the op. The British Army and air force formulated a
combined plan, and successfully exec that because the Army, and Air Force comds
and their staff were working together at one Headquarters.
3. Seperation
of Armr. Rommel kept his two
Panzer Divs to the rear, seperated from each other by about 25 miles. This
seperation of his armr was another unusual decision - again forced on him by
the exigencies of the fuel sit. This had two advantages to him, firstly he was
able o use bulk of his armr for instant C attk against any place and secondly
he had armr in vicinity without using too much fuel.
4. Hitler’s
Order to Hold on. On ni 2 Nov
Rommel decided to wdr to Fuka. But Hitler insisted that the posn must be held
to the last man which Rommel had to obey with a hy heart. Without Hitler’s
message Rommel would have has one mor day in which to org his retreat and
perhaps made an effective stand farther west at one of the recognized def posn which the two armies had
fought over so many times. Rommel later asserted that the 24 hrs delay after
Hitler’s first order came through was his only mistake and robbed him off of
the opportunity of saving his non motorized - largly Italian Inf in a battle
worthy conditions.
5. A
man with Qualities. “On British
part it was too narrow movs, too much caution, too little sense of time factor,
unwillingness push on in the battle to keep in mind the essential reqs of
decisive exploitation” - says Liddle Hart. Throughout his long retreat to
Tunisia, Rommel was to exploit these short comings in his opponent’s tac so
successfully that it is hard to believe how few tps he had fighting against the
massive and the deliberate adv of the 8th Army. His divs after the battle were
down to fewer than 10 tks each, and his total fighting str was about 7500 men
in all - 5000 Germans and 2500 Italians against at least 20 times that number.
Yet at early stage of the wdr, after each leap back wards, he stayed just long
enough to force the British to assault on his posn - before he slipped away
once again.
6. Reason
of Success. The reason so
many of Rommel’s attks were successful is not that they contained any
unexpected initial plan of attk but that, inspite of being predictable, they
were executed through the initial and earlier phases with such bolness and
speed that their subsequent phases became unpredicteble and it was then that
Rommel’s genius for instant improvisation and inventiveness came into its own.
7. Regrouping The initial layout of British forces
together with speedy regrouping required by the course of the action had
ensured preservation of balance throughout the battle fd. It had thus been
unnec to cfm to rommel’s thurst, British seized the initative and forced Rommel
to pull back his offensive.
8. Deception
9. Fake radio net
10. Comm of plan to senior ech as late as
possible
11. Destructiion of Geraman Inf
12. Superior no of tks
13. More noo of A tk guns
14. Tiger Tks not made aval by Hitler
15. Long dist of naval basas
16. Allied air superiority
17. Quick/Concealed regrouping by Montgomery
18. Flexibility of British Plan
OP `TORCH`
1. The British
would land at Algiers and Oran. Americans were resp for Casablanca.
2. Eisenhower was the incharge of op. The
date for the op was 8 Nov 42.
3. The mov of
sea armada was kept secret from Germans by certain key pieces of misldg info by
British agents.
4. Plan/Obj. The occupation of Algeria and French Morocco
by comb British and America forces with a view to the early occupation of
Tunisia.
5. Forces
a. Air
Force
(1) Allied. Eastern Air Comd comprising the area east of Cape Tenez (330
miles east of Gibralter) under Air Marshal Sir Willain Welsh. The western Air
Comd - the area west of Cape Tenez under Maj Gen Doolittle (12 US Air Force).
Air Marshal
Walsh Gen
Doolittle
Gibralter Algiers Oran
Casablanca Total
Catlians 24 - - - 24
Hudsans 20 20
- - 40
Bombers - 72 57 114 243
Fighters -
162 320 240 722
PRU 6 6 - - 12
1,041
(2)
Axis
Luftwaff Italy Total Vichy
Sicily Sicily, Tripoli,
Sardinia North Africa
Bombers 106 134 240 185
Fighter 36 195 231 218
Recce 27 102 129
83
600 486
b. Allied Military Forces The aslt forces to be landed to capture the
three ports numbered approx 70,000 :
(1)
Eastern (Algiers)
Taks
Aslt Force under Maj Gen Ryder, U.S Army.
Two U.S Cbt Teams, 39th and 168th 9,000
Two British
Bde Gp, 11th and 36th 9,000
Two Allied
Comdos, 1 and VI 2,000
20,000
The
landing at Algiers was to be fol up by the British First Army under Lt Gen
K.A.N. Anderson.
(2) Centre (Oran)
Task Aslt force under
Maj Gen Lloyd R.Fredendall, U.S. Army.
Three U.S
Regt Cbt Teams, 13,500
16th, 18th
and 26th
One Armd
Cbt Comd 4,500
(Plus 180 tks)
First
Ranger Bn 500
18,500
This landing was to be fol up by an American Force.
(3) Western (Casablanca)
Task
Aslt Force under Maj Gen S.Patton, U.S Army. This was to sail dir from the
United States and planning had nec to be carried out in Washington.
Five U.S
Regt Cbt Team 22,500
7th, 15th,
30th, 47th and 60th
One Armd
Cbt Comd 4,500
One Regt
2,000
One Armd
Cbt Team (2 Bns) 2,000
31,000
f. Naval Forces. The great assy of British naval forces was
under the comd of Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Bart as N.C.E.F (Naval Comd
Expeditionary Force) withComdore R. M. Dick as his Chief of Staff. It was
rendered possible only by reducing convoy forces in the Atlantic to the
narrowest possible limits.
The Naval
Task Force were constituted as follows :-
Eastern Naval Task Force
(Algiers) - E. N. T. F.
Centre
Naval Task Force (Oran) - C. N. T. F.
Western
Naval Task Force (Casablanca)- W. N.
T. F.
Force H
Force R
Force Q
This post was written by: Franklin Manuel
Franklin Manuel is a professional blogger, web designer and front end web developer. Follow him on Twitter
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