Tuesday, June 4, 2013

THE EMPLOYMENT IF AIR - NORTH AFRICA 1941


THE EMPLOYMENT IF AIR - NORTH AFRICA 1941

INTRODUCTION

1.      Since time immemorial, man's obsession with flight had brought about many a thinker to ponder a means of conquering the skies.
Physicists, poets and captains of war alike thought up strange and off, unworkable, deals of aerial transport. Yet it was not until the combustion engine and couple it to their ingenuity in the form of a fragile machine, which took a flight from a hill into the greatest of man's fantasies.

2.      The days of aerial transport had finally arrived and it was not long after their arrival that the use of aircraft as a ne mand of waging war, came under the intense scrutiny of the world at large.

3.      It is in those exciting days of new inventions and indoctrination, that the second world war erupted, leaving billions affected in its wake. And ironically, it was during World War II (WWII), that all these new inventions (notably air craft, tanks, munitions, guns and submarines), were put to their true test.

4.      Within  WWII, the North African theater holds  a special niche of interest for students of military history, in the fact that it was one of the proving grounds for what is now, accepted to be a major battle winning assets Air.


EMPLOYMENT OF AIR IN NORTH AFRICA 1941

Background of the campaign

7.      Hitler's much touted concept of Lebensraum, began to assume farcical proportions as the war started spreading to hitherto uninvolved areas of the glob. Basically, in a war where half the military might of the world was potted against the other half, a bizarre notion of honour amongst thieves became predominant Fascist Italy, under Benito Mussolini, was involved in a  bid to ensure its stranglehold on the Mediterranean by annexing most of the surrounding areas. This situation was unacceptable t Britain as it had its own vested interests in ensuring a safe passage for its trade to the East Indies. Hire it is worth mentioning that the Mediterranean constituted a huge 'shortcut' for any maritime shipping to the East, via the Suez Canal. The alternate option would have been the dreaded 'journey round the Cape (of Good Hope)'. In such a scenario, it was economics rather than war for the sake of it, which drew Britain into the fray.

8.      On the other  hand,       Germany and Hitler, had their hands full. After his sweep through France and the Law Countries, the German dictator was facing prospects of invading a number of countries individually (later choosing all, simultaneously), including his nemesis, Great Britain But Hitler too, forever the cautious military economist, was also looking to expand his resources. North Africa presented him with not only an opportunity to do so, but also to inflict losses on Britain, by coming to Mussolini's assistance. Hence the phrase 'honour amongst thieves'.

9.      It was thus, that North Africa found itself awash with a stange t5riumvirate of Germinate, Britain and Italy. Hitler dispatched his most feared and revered general, Erwin Rommel to raise the Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK), to enjoin battle with Britain, thouse and of miles away from both hi8s own , and her home base.

Comparison of Force

10.    With such a campaign of attrition and swaying fortunes as the North African theater , it becomes difficult to correctly assess the opposing forces. More so once the powers involved, were countries with vast amounts of men and materiel. Thus the most accurate description of the balance  of forces in the campaign can be drawn from an analysis to those at the outset :-

          a.       Air

                   (1)     Britain- The Desert Air Force (DAF)

                             Serial No    Type of Aircraft    Number    Nomenclature

                             (a)                        Fighter       63           Gladiator      
                             (b)                        Bomber      72            Blenheim
                             (c)                        Bomber      21             Lysander
                             (d)                        Flying-boat          10             Sunderland
                             (e)                        TOTAL      166

                   (2)     Italy - The Regia Aeronautica
                        
                             Serial No    Type of Aircraft    Number    Nomenclature

                             (a)                        Fighter       54           Breda 65       
                             (b)                        Fighter       32           R 30
                             (c)                        Fighter       53           Ghibli
                             (d)                        Bomber      28           RO 37
                             (e)                        Bomber      37            Junkers Ju 86
                             (f)                         Recce                   45          Haartebeests
                             (g)                        TOTAL      239       

                             Note: An ability to move 400 bombers Naples, Taranto and Catania was a fact established by both British intelligence and the office of the Deputy Director of War Organization.

                   (3)     Germany - The Luftwaffe

                             Serial No    Type of Aircraft    Number

                             (a)               Bombers              150
                             (b)              Dive-bombers     90
                             (c)               Single engine       40
                                                Fighters
                             (d)              Twin engine                  10
                                                Fighter
                             (e)               Recce                            30
                             (f)               TOTAL                390

          b.       Land Forces   As the North African campaign was actually in progress much before the start of 1941, the quantum of forces of both sides varied considerably from the later figures. In addition to this fact, obviously, as the battle progressed, proportionally, the sizes of both sides swelled. Thus , to ensure uniformity, and for ease of assimilation, the Orders of Battle of both sides are (intentionally), those before the actual enjoining of battle (prior to Operation Battleaxe). Refer to Annex A.

11.    Qualitative Comparison of Air associated facilities. Over and above the fact that the Axis forces enjoyed an overwhelming numeric superiority, the equipment on their inventory was far superior to that of the Allies. In terms of Air only, the German Messerschmidt Me 109s and junkets JU 86s, were at any , rate, far superior to the obsolescent Lysanders, Sunderlands and Gauntlets Possessed by the British Add to this the fact that the Axis were better established in the fields of maintenance in these areas are as under :-

          a.       Technolobical edge of German and Italian aircraft.

          b.       More established ground facilities of Acis forces.

          c.       Greater ordnance carrying capacity of Acis aircraft.

          d.       Higher flight ceiling.

          e.       Over extended Line of Communication of British, whilst Axis   could rely on Greece, Crete, Cyrenaica adnd Sicily.


          f.       Axis aircraft, especially those of the Regia Aeronautica were      more suited to operation in the desert, being more or less        designed for them, as opposed to the British and German      aircraft which were standardised for operations ranging from           the Ardennes to Archangel.

Employment of Air
                            

12.    Axis

          a.       Pattern of Operations.  In the Desert theatre, by and largee,         the emerging paitern lof operations conducted by the Axis    forces (more notably the Luftwaffe) ncompassed a board sphers   of actions (efer to Anner B, Employment of Air by Aixs           Forces).
                   The board perimeters of theuswe of Air are as under :--

                   (1)     Combat Air Patrolling.

                   (2)     Aerial reconnaissance.

                   (3)     Tectical Land - Air warfare.

                   (4)     Strategic bombing.

                   (5)     Maritime Air Operations

                             (a)     Against naval targets.

                             (b)     Against merchant ships.

                             (c)     Marine interdiction.

                             (d)     Martime convoy escort.

                   (6)     Ground Interdiction.

          b.       Conceptual strengths.

                   (1)     Concentration.

                   (2)     Aggression.

                   (3)     Diversity of roles.

                   (4)     Techonlogical superiority.
         
                   (5)     Destruction ofenemy Air resources, focus on Centre of                         Gravity.

                   (6)     Boldness of Planning.

                   (7)     Deception.

          c.       Weaknesses
                  
                   (1)     Over extended Line of Communications.

                   (2)     Lack of clarity of purpose.

                   (3)     Resources not commensurate to task "Kesselring shickt                        mir kein shprit".

                   (4)     Progressive qualitative and quantitative decline.

                   (5)     Over provision lofAir to land forces, not enough Air to                        defeat enemy Air arm lefty.

13.    Allied

          a.       Patteern of Operations.  Here, the phrase "Allied" is somewhat             misleading, as an overwhelming number of the Air resources     used were Britis. However there was a verylow percentage of   American aeroplanes which augmented the resources of the      Desert Air Force. The Allied  employment ofall available    resources (referto Annex B, Employment of Air by Allied           Dorces) can be notaarised as under :-

                   (1)     Anti air operations.

                   (2)     Limited close support.

                   (3)     Small unit action dogfights.

                   (4)     Air cargo transportation and aerial supply of fground                            forces.

                   (5)     Deep raids in conjunction with ground forces (notably                          LRDGs).

          b.       Conceptual Strengths

                   (1)     Unconventional tactics.

                   (2)     Economy of effort.

                   (3)     Progressive qualitative and auantitative enhancement of                       resources.

          c.       Weaknesses

                   (1)     Numeric inferiority in initial phases of the campaign.

                   (2)     Poor standard of equipment in comparison to Axis.

                   (3)     Logistic plans not commensurate to tactical plans.

PRESENT DAY SCENARIO

Threat Perception

14.    The Indian Air Force (IAF).  After a sequential analysis of the  
employment of Air in 1941, it is pertinent that before we study the effects of
Air in any future conflict ofour own we perceive the threat to us from our
adversary.  The Cold war years allowed India to build up an Air Force
comparable  to many modern air fleets of the world. In terms of numbers as
well as technology, the Indian Air Force (IAF)is indeed , a highly advanced
body of men and machines.

         
                            



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